Empirical Study On Equity Incentive Of Senior Executives And Corporate Bank Borrowing

At present,China's economy suffers from the impact of internal and external environment,and the downward pressure increases.As a result,the non-performing loan ratio of Banks rises,and the interest rate liberalization brings about a narrowing of the interest margin,the operational risk of Banks is also increasing.As the main channel of social financing and the main provider of funds,Banks play an important role in China's economic development.When making credit decisions,the most important consideration for Banks is whether the funds currently provided can be recovered in time and in full in the future.Because of the problem of asymmetric information,Banks will conduct an all-round investigation of enterprises when lending.Corporate governance,as an important internal management mechanism,has increasingly become the key factor to judge whether a company is qualified or not,and executive equity incentive,as an important part of corporate governance,has increasingly attracted the attention and research of scholars.As one of the ways to alleviate the principal-agent problem,equity incentive can convey positive corporate governance information to Banks.Therefore,what impact will the implementation of executive equity incentive plan have on corporate bank borrowing? In order to better guide the practice of enterprises and the consideration of Banks when making credit decisions theoretically,it is necessary to conduct research on such issues based on China's special national conditions.This paper mainly explores the influence of senior executives' equity incentive on corporate bank borrowing of listed companies in China.From the perspectives of corporate bank borrowing structure,duration,types and intensity of senior executives' equity incentive,this paper conducts corresponding research and analysis by combining normative research with empirical research.On the basis of literature research,combined with information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory,this paper analyzes the relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate bank borrowing,and puts forward relevant assumptions.This paper selects China's nonfinancial a-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as research samples,selects variables,constructs models and USES multiple linear regression method to verify the hypothesis proposed in this paper.The results show that: with the implementation of executive equity incentive policy,the long-term loan provided by Banks to enterprises decreases significantly;However,with the enhancement of executive equity incentive intensity,enterprises can obtain more total bank loans and short-term loans,which are significantly positive at the levels of 1% and 5% respectively.This suggests that the enterprise shall,by improving the executive equity incentive strength way to get the favour of the bank,thus to provide more loans,and the intensity of executive equity incentive promotion to the enterprise get more bank borrowing was not significant effect for a long time,it also conforms to the theory of debt maturity structure,because more than short-term borrowing in long-term borrowing has supervision function.If the way of stock incentive for executives is distinguished,restricted stock can make enterprises obtain more total bank loans and short-term loans.Stock options,on the other hand,have no significant effect on Banks' ability to lend more to companies.This indicates that stock options are more risky to implement than restricted stock,and Banks have identified risks to some extent,so they tend to provide more credit support to enterprises implementing restricted stock with less risk.