Empirical Research On The Influence Of Executive Incentive On The M?A Performance Of Listed Internet Companies

Since 2013,China's Internet companies have frequent M&A activities.Most of the research on M&A performance of the Internet industry has focused on case studies.Few scholars have conducted in-depth empirical analysis on the general M&A behavior of the Internet industry.On the other hand,as an external means of corporate governance,M&A is inseparable from the internal factors of corporate governance such as management incentives.Therefore,this paper takes the Internet companies listed and merged as a research sample,and puts the M&A performance problem of Internet companies under the framework of corporate governance,and deeply and comprehensively studies the influence of executive incentives on the M&A performance of Internet companies.This paper first defines the concepts of Internet companies,M&A,M&A performance and executive incentives,and reviews the relevant economic theories of M&A and executive incentives.Secondly,after analyzing the M&A practice of listed Internet companies in China,the Internet companies that completed the mergers and acquisitions in 2012-2015 were selected as samples,and the factor analysis method was used to establish the M&A performance evaluation score model,and the comprehensive scores of M&A performance of each enterprise were calculated.Then,based on the score results,the independent sample T test is used to objectively evaluate the M&A performance of listed Internet companies.Thirdly,the mechanism analysis of executive incentives and M&A performance is carried out.The relationship between executive incentives and M&A performance of Internet companies is analyzed from the perspectives of executive monetary compensation,implicit income and equity incentives.Finally,based on the previous paper,the multivariate regression method is used to explore the influence of the three on M&A performance,and the corresponding conclusions are drawn and suggestions are made.Through the above research,this paper mainly obtains the following research conclusions: Firstly,after the merger and acquisition of Internet companies,the performance of enterprises has obviously decreased first and then increased,indicating that mergers and acquisitions among Internet companies can significantly affect corporate performance,and long-term mergers and acquisitions.The impact of performance is significantly greater than the short-term.Secondly,there is a significant positive correlation between executive monetary compensation and short-term M&A performance,but the impact on long-term M&A performance is not obvious.Explain that the disciplinary effect brought by mergers and acquisitions in the short term and the incentive effect brought by high salary can regulate the principal-agent contradiction between shareholders and management.The regression results also show that although the hidden income of executives is positively correlated with M&A performance,the correlation is not significant.The reason for this may be that the behavior of executives using control rights for onthe-job consumption is not significant.Equity incentives for executives have a significant positive impact on M&A performance in both long-term and short-term,indicating that the management of China's Internet companies has a small shareholding ratio and low equity incentives.In future business operations,equity measures may be considered to increase equity.Constrain management behavior.Finally,based on the research results,this paper puts forward suggestions for improving the M&A performance of Internet enterprises.It is necessary to make efforts from three aspects.First,combine the stage of industrial evolution to effectively carry out the strategic deployment of M&A among Internet enterprises.Second,optimize the enterprise scientifically and rationally.The salary structure actively promotes the improvement of the executive incentive system;the third is to strengthen government supervision and establish a sound and effective manager market.