Research On The Impact Of Ownership And Executive Incentive On The Performance Of Listed Companies

Since the reform and opening up,great progress has been made in the reform of state-owned enterprises,which has been integrated with the market in general,and has made great contributions to promoting economic and social development,ensuring and improving people's livelihood,opening up international markets and enhancing China's comprehensive strength.However,the state-owned enterprises are affected by such factors as the imperfect principal-agent and executive incentive system,which leads to the increase of agency cost,resulting in such negative problems as insider control,interest transmission,loss of state-owned assets,etc.,which affect the performance of enterprises.How to formulate a scientific and efficient executive incentive system,reduce the cost of principal-agent and improve the performance of state-owned enterprises in the context of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises,needs effective empirical research as support.From the perspective of principal-agent theory,this paper studies the effect of executive incentive on corporate performance,and further analyzes the differences in the impact of executive incentive on corporate performance in different equity companies.The conclusion has certain theoretical and practical significance for improving executive incentive system of Listed Companies in China.Based on the literature and theory at home and abroad,this paper defines the relevant concepts and analyzes the nature of equity,executive compensation incentive,the relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate performance.Through the principal-agent theory,incentive theory,information asymmetry theory,this paper analyzes the current situation of executive incentive in China's listed companies.Based on the theoretical analysis,this paper puts forward the corresponding research hypotheses,selects the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as the samples,constructs the model with the relevant variables of equity nature,executive incentive and corporate performance,and conducts the empirical regression analysis with STATA.12.0.On this basis,it analyzes the heterogeneity of the research content in the region,industry and time.The results show that:the level of executive compensation incentive has a significant positive impact on the performance of listed companies;the level of equity incentive has a significant positive impact on the performance of listed companies;the level of executive compensation incentive has a significant positive impact on the performance of state-owned listed companies;the level of executive equity incentive has a significant positive impact on the performance of state-owned listed companies;the form of state-owned holding organization has a significant positive impact on the performance of listed companies Performance has a significant negative impact.Propose to improve executive compensation incentive mechanism.Establish a mechanism for senior management restraint.We will deepen the reform of mixed ownershipof state-owned enterprises.Countermeasures and suggestions on deepening the reform of incentive system for senior executives in state-owned enterprises.