Research On The Impact Of Financial Analyst Tracking On Corporate Violations

The financial analysts has been produced and developed along with the establishment of the capital market.The economic consequences of the behavior of financial analysts and the role in capital market have been widely concerned by the practical and academic circles.In the mid-to-late 20th century,the theory of principal-agent theory emerged.Jensen and Meckling,prominent contributors to the theory,pointed out in their writings that the existence of financial analysts can reduce the agency conflict between investors and managers,and plays an important role in the regulation of corporate misconduct.The earnings forecast research report released by financial analysts can enable investors to understand the relevant information of listed companies more deeply,thus exerting a supervisory role on the business activities and improving the effectiveness of corporate governance.Therefore,this paper focuses on the analysis of whether financial analysts track forecasts in China's capital markets can significantly reduce the occurrence of corporate violations and reduce the extent of violations.In addition,due to the complexity of China's institutional background and the important role of the government in the allocation of market resources,the phenomenon of listed companies with political background is widespread,which has an important impact on production and operation.Therefore,based on the theory of principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper studies the impact of financial analysts' tracking prediction on corporate irregularities,and further examines the regulatory role of listed companies,political context in their relationship.In recent years,the damage of earnings management to enterprises has attracted extensive attention from scholars at home and abroad.Based on the above research,this paper further analyzes the process of corporate analysts' violation of earnings management behavior through financial intermediary analysis.This article consists of five chapters.The first chapter is the introduction.The main contents are the research background,research ideas,research methods and innovations.At the same time,the author reviews the influencing factors of domestic and foreign corporate violations,political connections and the relevant literature on the economic consequences of financial analysts' behavior.The second chapter is the concept definition and theoretical basis,and clearly defines the important concepts of financial analysts,corporate violations,political connections,etc.On this basis,the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory are further discussed in detail,and the theory and research content are combined.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Firstly,it describes the status of China's financial analyst industry development and the status of corporate violations.Secondly,it discusses the mechanism of financial analysts' tracking of the violations of corporate behaviors,and the regulatory mechanism of the listed company's political context in the relationship,and finally derives the research hypothesis of this paper.The fourth chapter is the empirical test results and analysis,this paper selects the 19940 samples of all A-share listed companies in China's capital market from 2007 to 2016 as the research object,and uses the Logit and Ordered Logit regression methods in empirical analysis to test the research hypothesis of this paper.Finally,the endogenous problem is further excluded in the robustness test,which has improved the credibility and persuasiveness of this article.The fifth chapter is the research conclusions and policy recommendations,and analyzes the research deficiencies and research prospects of this paper.The study found that:(1)financial analysts tracked forecasts significantly inhibited corporate violations;(2)when listed companies have a politically relevant background,significantly enhanced the financial analysts' tracking predictions against corporate violations;(3)corporate violations Behavior as a mediator variable plays a part in mediating effects in the process of financial analysts affecting the company's real earnings management.The research results of this paper have rich theoretical and practical significance.In terms of theoretical significance,it expands the research scope of financial analyst behavior and corporate violation behavior,and supplements the related research on political related economic consequences;in the practical sense,it is Financial analysts'tracking behaviors have a theoretical basis for influencing corporate governance,making listed companies pay more attention to the external supervisory power of financial analysts.