The Impact Of Managerial Ownership On Audit Opinion-shopping

Since the end of the 1990s,with the disclosure of major financial fraud cases at home and abroad,audit collusion has not only harmed the interests of business owners,but also reduced the trust of the expected users of the statements on the audit quality of the firm.When listed companies attend audit opinion-shopping and cover up the actual financial situation with false financial information,they will mislead investors to make decisions and reduce the effectiveness of resource allocation in the securities market.Therefore,it is extremely necessary to pay more attention to the audit opinion-shopping behavior and increase supervision.It is of great significance to study the factors affecting the audit opinion-shopping and to identify them.As an important means for the company's shareholders to supervise the management's business behavior,independent external audit can reduce the agency cost,and the occurrence of the audit opinion-shopping behavior indicates that there is a huge agency conflict.At the same time,executives' shareholding is an important way to ease the conflict between the business owners and managers,and to maintain a consistent interest.Therefore,it is necessary to explore how executive shareholding affects the audit opinion-shopping behavior from the perspective of equity incentives.The existing audit opinion-shopping related research is more from the audit business itself to investigate whether the company's change auditor has audit opinion-shopping behavior,etc.,and does not pay special attention to the series of root causes of the company's power control behind the audit opinion-shopping behavior.The problem is that there are few discussions on how the equity incentives such as executive shareholdings affect the company's audit opinion-shopping behavior.Therefore,this paper starts from the perspective of principal-agent and equity incentives,and studies how the executive shareholding affects the company's audit opinion-shopping behavior.At the same time,it considers the two dimensions of property setting and property rights,and explores its shareholding in executives.The regulatory role of audit opinion-shopping.This paper takes the listed company in 2012-2017 as a sample and adopts the audit opinion-shopping estimation model(Lennox,2000).It analyzes and tests the influence of executive stock ownership on the company's audit opinion-shopping behavior,and considers the dual job setting and property rights.Among them,the regulation.The study found that listed companies have the behavior of audit opinion-shopping by changing auditors.Executive shareholding will significantly reduce the audit opinion-shopping behavior of listed companies.Compared with the two jobs,the executive shareholding of the two positions is more restraining on the audit opinion-shopping behavior.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the holdings of executives in private enterprises have a greater inhibitory effect on the audit opinion-shopping.The significance of this paper is as follows:(1)This paper makes up for the lack of executive research to ignore the influence of executives' shareholdings on the audit opinion-shopping behavior,and broadens the research perspective of executives'shareholding participation in audit opinion-shopping.(2)Provide investors with a basis for decision-making on whether the company may have an audit opinion-shopping.(3)This paper provides the research conclusions between the relationship between executives and audit opinion-shopping of listed companies in China,which provides a new reference for China's equity incentive reform,and also provides important for further improving the company's management mechanism and optimizing the enterprise's control environment.reference.