Stock Incentives Of High-Tech Enterprise,Venture Capital And Ambidextrous Innovation

At present,China is under the strategic background of innovation-driven development.For high-tech enterprises that are microscopic entities,On the one hand,it shoulders the heavy responsibility of leading innovation and promoting economic development in the region.On the other hand,it needs to continuously carry out innovation activities to create sustainable competitive advantages.In this context,based on the Principal-Agent Theory,how to establish a reasonable stock incentive system to improve managers' tendency to make innovative decisions has become a concern.At the same time,with the development of innovation theory,the Ambidextrous Innovation Theory has gradually entered the field of scholars,which makes the research around stock incentives and enterprise innovation appear to be further improved.That is to say,the existing research ignores the heterogeneity of innovation,and only discusses the impact of stock incentives on enterprise innovation from the perspective of innovation homogeneity.It is on this basis that the article takes China's A-share high-tech enterprises in2011-2016 as the research object,and discusses the impact of stock incentives on different types of innovation activities from the perspective of innovation duality.At the same time,Considering the important role of venture capital in leading the development of high-tech enterprises,the article introduces variable venture capital.Considering the important role of venture capital in leading the development of high-tech enterprises,the article introduces variable venture capital,by combing how venture capital affects managers' risk appetite and risk choices,it analyzes the impact of venture capital on ambidextrous innovation while analyzing whether venture capital plays a moderating effect between stock incentives and ambidextrous innovation.The results show that:(1)In high-tech enterprises,stock incentives can significantly promote exploratory innovation,and there is an inverted U-type relationship with exploitative innovation.(2)Venture capital is conducive to promoting exploratory innovation,but reduces the marginal effect of stock incentives on exploratory innovation.At the same time,venture capital has not had a significant impact on exploitative innovation,and has not significantly affected the marginal effect of stock incentives on exploitative innovation.The conclusions obtained have certain guiding significance for the corporate governance of high-tech enterprises and the further development of policies by the government to promote the development of venture capital.