Going-Concern Opinion?Institutional Investor And Underinvestment

The development potential of listed companies and the growth of their operating income are affected by many factors,among which the efficiency of resource allocation plays an important role.As we all know,there are various ways for enterprises to allocate existing resources,and investment is one of the important ways.Whether the investment decision is scientific and whether the investment project can bring beneficial benefits are the key issues concerned by the stakeholders of listed companies.However,the actual situation in operation of the securities market is not completely conforms to the original intent of maximum investment profit,securities market information obtained from each subject has the asymmetry,the principal-agent relationship of agency problem is widespread,which makes the management of listed companies have the opportunity to make damage to the enterprise value of the investment behavior.Therefore,the information asymmetry and the common principal-agent problem in listed companies are the root causes of the phenomenon of enterprise underinvestment.Institutional investors and external independent audits affect the openness of information.In addition,in recent years,more and more scholars found by issuing going concern audit opinions of the listed company in the proportion of listed companies is more and more high,at the same time,due to national policies and ease the introduction of institutional investors,further perfecting of market economy in our country,the stock market,institutional investors play an increasingly important role.Therefore,as an external governance mechanism that can play a supervisory role in enterprises,both the opinions of continuing operations audit and institutional investors will have a great impact on the underinvestment of listed companies.The current stage,many scholars have studied the governance role of institutional investors,however,when study the governance role to join more intuitive audit conclusion,the research between institutional investors to audit conclusion and inadequate investment regulation related literature is relatively rare,in view of this,based on the research on the governance role of institutional investors,joined the going concern audit opinions of this variable.The characteristics of this paper are as follows:(1)add the variable of audit conclusion,and systematically analyze whether institutional investors can continue to play a role in corporate governance after enterprises are issued with the audit opinions of going concern.(2)in combination with the specific situation of China's capital market,this paper further differentiates the sample from the heterogeneity and property right nature of institutional investors in different dimensions,and discusses and studies the influence of the interaction between institutional investors and continuous operation audit opinions on the problem of insufficient investment in different dimensions.Findings are as follows:(1)of this article compose investors can alleviate underinvestment(2)of listed companies in China to continue as a going concern audit opinions will deteriorate insufficient investment of listed companies in China(3)institutional investors generally unable to continue as a going concern audit opinions and the adjustment of the relationship between the inadequate investment have a significant role,but the pressure resistance on the relationship between the type of institutional investors have played a positive role in regulating,the stress sensitivity of institutional investors to aggravate the deterioration of the going concern audit opinions of underinvestment.(4)the above problems have different results in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the empirical data of all a-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2017,this paper discusses the interaction between institutional investors and continuous operation audit opinions on the issue of insufficient investment.The research conclusion will have important practical significance for shareholders to restrain the behavior of management and strengthen the internal and external governance and external audit supervision of the company.At the same time,it can also enrich the research perspective of the underinvestment of listed companies,and further expand and supplement the theoretical literature on the underinvestment of listed companies.