Research On The Impact Of Heterogeneous Institutional Investors On The Quality Of Information Disclosure

As the basis of capital market transactions,information directly reflects the company's operating results and financial status.High-quality information disclosure can enable investors to more realistically understand the current situation of the enterprise,thereby providing an effective reference for their further decision-making.However,the accuracy and openness of company information disclosure still need to be improved to a certain extent.Low-quality information disclosure damages the interests of investors and restricts the further development of the capital market.As a provider of corporate information,the management is restricted by the company's internal governance structure and will affect the quality of information disclosure.In addition,institutional investors have become the backbone of my country's securities market and play an important role in the process of corporate governance.However,different types of institutional investors have differences in investment direction,investment methods,shareholding length,and operating methods.This will lead to differences in the enthusiasm of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance,which will affect the quality of information disclosure.Therefore,this paper attempts to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure through corporate governance by studying the governance role of heterogeneous institutional investors in corporate information disclosure and the differences in impact under different governance structures and shareholding structures.This article defines the concepts of institutional investors,corporate governance and information disclosure quality on the basis of reviewing relevant literature,and analyzes the development status.Using principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and cost-benefit theory to theoretically analyze the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors and information disclosure,and put forward research hypotheses.Taking the listed companies of my country Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018 as the research sample,the statistical software Stata14.0 was used for empirical analysis.The results show that:First,the holding of pressure-resistant institutional investors is conducive to improving the quality of information disclosure,while the role of pressure-sensitive institutional investors is not significant.Second,the combination of the chairman and general manager in corporate governance has suppressed the effect of pressure-resistant institutional investors on the quality of information disclosure.Third,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,pressure-resistant institutional investments in state-owned enterprises Can effectively improve the quality of information disclosure.Based on the research results of this article,I make a few suggestions:standardize the operation of the capital market,improve the corporate governance structure,increase policy support and establish a fair and transparent market environment.This article deepens the research on institutional investors,information disclosure quality and other issues.It also provides a theoretical reference for companies to improve corporate internal governance and a reasonable balance of management power.It also provides practical directions for the orderly development of institutional investors in my country.