Study On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholdera's Tunneling On The Risk Of Stock Market Crash

Under the agency theory,large shareholders,as an important corporate governance mechanism,play an important role in corporate governance and the healthy development of the stable capital market.However,there will also be another kind of agency problem,that is,the problem of large shareholders'exploitation of small and medium shareholders.In China,equity concentration is a common phenomenon in listed companies.Controlling shareholders control most of the company's resources,and they hold the highest proportion of shares in listed companies.However,due to the stock ownership system problems in our country,the controlling shareholders1 shares cannot flow in the secondary market,so there is a situation of "different Dividends with the same share".Controlling shareholders are not satisfied with the current earnings.They often use their control power to gain private benefits from abnormal channels and transfer corporate resources by using their control power over listed companies.Therefore,the problem of large shareholder tunneling is widespread.Under the circumstance of low information transparency in our country,for the sake of their career and personal reputation,company management often choose to hide bad news from the outside world.Slowly,"bad news" backlog in the company,when "bad news" backlog too much to digest.At this time,"bad news"will be released centrally,triggering a stock price crash.There are many studies on the risk of stock price crash and the tunneling of large shareholders at home and abroad,but there is no literature directly examining the relationship between the tunneling of large shareholders and the risk of stock price crash.China's institutional environment and information legal environment are important experimental sites for the study of large shareholders'tunneling behavior.It is of great significance for the healthy and orderly development of listed companies to further explore its relationship with the risk of stock price crash and its internal influence mechanism.This paper chooses the data of all A-share listed companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2015 as the research sample,and studies the impact of large shareholders'tunneling on the risk of stock price crash from the perspective of the second kind of agency problem.On this basis,this paper also conducts an expanding study.The research finds that:(1)large shareholder tunneling is positively related to the risk of future stock price crash;(2)compared with state-owned enterprises,the positive impact of large shareholder tunneling on the risk of stock price crash is more significant in private enterprises;(3)under the same other conditions,the smaller the company size,the more significant the positive correlation between large shareholder tunneling and the risk of stock price crash;(4)analysts Concern can weaken the positive relationship between large shareholders'tunneling and stock price crash risk.