Research On The Influence Of Ownership Structure On Stock Price Crash Risk

In recent years,China's stock market has been volatility,and there have been many “one thousand stocks down” situation in history.Since 2015,China's stock market has experienced a violent shock from “mad cow” to “stock disaster”.The stock price “surge and plunged” has become an important phenomenon in the capital market.The instability of stock price reduces the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market and ultimately affects the entity.In 2017,the Central Economic Conference proposed to prevent major risks.Under such a background,how to prevent capital market risks and effectively alleviate the risk of stock price crash has become a hot issue of concern to the government,practice and academic circles.The risk of stock price crash is mainly due to the company's management hiding the company's "bad news" for self-interested motives,increasing information asymmetry.Shareholders,institutional investors and other stakeholders may play a “supervising effect” on management or collude with management to jointly occupy the interests of minority shareholders;Under equity incentives,management can reduce the moral hazard caused by post-information asymmetry under the “incentive effect” or maximize the self-interest by exerting “trunk effect”.Whether the establishment of the ownership structure is reasonable determines the behavioral motives of the relevant stakeholders of the company,determines whether the internal governance mechanism of the company plays a governance role,affects the information asymmetry,and thus affects the risk of the company's stock price crash.Therefore,from the perspective of "quality" and "quantity",this paper systematically analyzes the impact of the ownership structure on the company's future share price crash.From a theoretical perspective,systematically combing the relevant literature on equity structure,stock price crash risk,ownership structure and stock price crash risk,and based on the theory of principal-agent theory,this paper expounds the theoretical analysis of equity concentration,equity balance,management shareholding and institutional investor holdings on stock price crash risk,and analyzes the relationship between information asymmetry and the relationship between the two.From the empirical point of view,this paper takes the relevant data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as the initial sample,and removes some samples to obtain 5,825 observations.Descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,multicollinearity test,regression analysis,etc.were performed using Excel and Stata14,and the following conclusions were obtained:(1)The more concentrated the equity,the ability to play the supervisory role of shareholders,suppress the management's selling behavior,reduce the accumulation of negative news,the less likely the company's future stock price crash;(2)Management shareholding,equity balance and institutional investor holdings are catalysts,increasing the risk of the company's share price crash;(3)From the perspective of information asymmetry,it is found that the degree of influence of the ownership structure on the stock price crash risk is more obvious in companies with low transparency of accounting information,and further tests have found that the relationship between the two is more obvious in companies with high R&D expenses or low analysts' attention.Further,taking into account both the “quality” and “quantity” factors of equity institutions,and incorporating them into the same research framework,it is found that the adjustment effect of equity concentration on the positive correlation between management shareholding and stock price crash risk is not significant.But the concentration of ownership plays a regulatory role in the positive correlation between institutional investors' shareholdings and the company's stock price crash risk.In other words,the increase in equity concentration eases the positive correlation between institutional investor holdings and the company's future stock price crash.In order to further explore the reliability of the empirical results,the robustness analysis was performed by changing the measurement methods of independent variables and dependent variables,and the analysis results further verified the above conclusions.Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions for exerting the governance role of the shareholding structure and preventing the possibility of the company's future stock price crash.