The Study Of Ownership Structure, Management Power And Stock Price Crash Risk

Ownership structure has been attracting the attention of scholars. It is a controversial issue to the academia what kind of ownership structure is better between centralized and dispersed ownership stake in companies in corporate governance. In this paper, from the point of view of the stock price crash risk analysis of this problem, this is because the stock price crash risk will affect to maximize shareholder value, damage the interests of shareholders. When a company’s share price plummeted by non-systemic factors, can be thought of as the company’s governance is poor or there is a problem. To explore the effectiveness of the two types of ownership structure on corporate governance, three problems will be put in this paper: From the perspective of stock price crash risk to explore, what kind of ownership structure is more effective? Which role been acted by the controlling shareholder’s among "watchdog role", " Tunneling " and "the role of synergy benefits " ? Which role been played by the minority shareholders of the company management between supervisory roles and just "voting with their feet" ?According to the above three problems, the research is based on the truth of Chinese capital market, the difference in diffuse ownership structure of the western capital market and the difference from previous research which management or shareholders was regarded as core variable. Attributed to the type of ownership structure determined by the shareholders’ shareholding distribution, the core of the contract is the managers and controlling shareholders. And the vulnerable groups of the benefit expropriation behavior often tend to be small and medium-sized shareholders. Therefore, by the means of regarding three roles as equal variables to research in this paper, it is possible to find the actual interaction relations and answer three questions proposed in this paper. The empirical analysis found that the first big shareholders can really play a significantly inhibit the self-interested behavior of managers to lower stock price crash risk. And further study found that controlling shareholders, as a whole, play a positive role, but also have hollowed behavior of medium and small shareholders. Study also found that minority shareholders in the listed companies of China still by "voting with their feet" to express their interest demands. Manager’s power does increase the risk of stock crash, but the CEO’s personal characteristics, such as qualifications, professional title, age, does not have significant correlation with self-interest behavior. According to whether it is state-owned, legal person share grouping, shares of full circulation and company size, further study found that the first big shareholder of state-owned property, legal person share shares of full circulation and company size are more significant to inhibit stock price crash risk. In addition, this paper also found that the higher growth enterprise, the greater the stock price crash risk; the lower the information transparency, also can increase the risk of the company’s share price collapse.According to the research conclusion of the possibility of influence the stock price crash risk factors, five countermeasures was put forward: firstly, to improve the transparency of information of listed companies; Secondly, to build perfect shareholder replacement mechanism; Thirdly, to develop institutional investors; Fourthly, to constantly promote the reform of system of the listed company; And finally, to strengthen the moral education of honesty education related personnel.