Research On The Assessment And Supervision Of Money Laundering Risks Of Third-party Payment Institutions

With the rapid development of third-party payment in China,the scale of transactions ranks first in the world.However,the pace of system construction to monitor the risk of money laundering is seriously lagging behind.Third-party Payment institutions fail to implement anti-money laundering obligations or assist illegal elements in money laundering and other irregularities frequently occur.Unlike ordinary illegal acts,money laundering is often accompanied by many high-risk acts such as inadequate implementation of Know Your Customer,misappropriation of reserve funds,theft or disclosure of payment account information,which have a bad impact on consumers and the whole society.In the era of risk society,it is of great significance to systematically and comprehensively identify and evaluate the money laundering risk of third-party payment institutions so as to implement effective supervision.Firstly,this paper combs the literature on "third-party payment","money laundering risk" and "money laundering risk in third-party payment" in domestic and foreign literature,and then discusses the necessity of monitoring money laundering risk by using Externality Theory,Asymmetric Information Theory and Anti-money Laundering Supervision Theory.According to the requirements of comprehensive risk management guidelines,the process of risk assessment and the formulation of risk supervision strategy are the basic process and important steps of risk management.Thus,this paper explores and summarizes the sources and common ways of money laundering in the third-party payment business combined with real cases,and gives a method to evaluate the risk of money laundering in the third-party payment institutions by using the residual risk derived from the relationship between inherent risk and control risk,which provides a basis for the 'Risk Based Approach'supervision of money laundering risk.In terms of the choice of regulatory strategies,this paper uses static game and dynamic evolutionary game analysis model to explore the optimal game strategy between regulatory authorities and third-party payment institutions,and makes numerical simulation analysis of its influencing factors.According to the results of risk assessment,measures such as differentiated supervision,improving positive incentives to pay institutions against money laundering,negative anti-money laundering fines and expanding reputation losses can promote the development of both sides towards the optimal strategy.In order to improve the supervision of money laundering risk in third-party payment institutions,the regulatory authorities need to standardize the anti-money laundering legislation aimed at the operation of third-party payment institutions and build a complete legal and regulatory framework;differentiated supervision based on the results of risk assessment is an important way to reduce the cost of supervision and strengthen the motive force of supervision;innovate the mode of supervision and strengthen the functional and behavioral supervision.Improving the anti-money laundering information sharing mechanism will help improve the efficiency of supervision and promote coordination of supervision;guiding the third-party payment industry to form a self-regulatory system as soon as possible and strengthening the responsibility consciousness of payment institutions can provide an important guarantee for the sustainable and healthy development of the third-party payment industry in China;Finally,the implementation of anti-money laundering incentive and punishment mechanism and information disclosure will help to increase the anti-money laundering motivation of third-party payment institutions and promote them to actively fulfill their anti-money laundering obligations.