An Empirical Study On The Effectiveness Of Internal Control,Perks And Enterprise Innovation Investment

In the 21 st century,independent innovation has become an indispensable and even decisive factor in the economic development of a country.At present,China's economic structure needs to be adjusted urgently,and the industrial structure needs to be optimized.The government is increasingly aware of the importance of scientific and technological innovation,and attaches great importance to the R&D investment of enterprises.In the report of the 18 th National Congress of the CPC,China formally referred to "implementing the strategy of innovation-driven development".In the report of the 19 th National Congress,General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that "innovation is the first driving force leading development and the strategic support for building a modern economic system",and once again put innovation at the core of national development.Management plays an important role in R&D and innovation activities of enterprises.However,due to the great risks of R&D activities,the high uncertainty of revenue compared with other projects,and the slow speed of effectiveness,management lacks motivation to carry out R&D activities without relevant incentives.Effective incentives can coordinate the interests of principals and agents,and promote management to attach importance to R&D innovation.In the existing research,there are few studies on the role of perks as an implicit incentive to enterprise innovation investment.Based on this,this paper studies the relationship between perks and R&D investment of enterprises.On the basis of predecessors,perks is divided into normal perks and excessive perks,and the relationship between perks and enterprise R&D investment is studied respectively.Because internal control plays an important role in ensuring the good operation of the company,it can supervise and restrict the internal operation of the enterprise.Therefore,this paper further studies the moderating effect of internal control on the relationship between excessive perks and enterprise innovation investment.On the basis of reviewing relevant literature,this paper puts forward corresponding hypotheses combining principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,incentive theory and technological innovation theory.Using the data from 2013 to 2017 as samples,this paper uses multiple regression model and grouping test to study the relationship among the effectiveness of internal control,perks and enterprise innovation investment.The main conclusions are as follows: Firstly,normal perks can promote the increase of R&D investment,reflecting the "efficiency concept",which is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises;secondly,excessive perks will inhibit R&D investment,reflecting the "agency concept";thirdly,internal control can inhibit the negative impact of excessive perks on R&D investment of enterprises.Further analysis shows that,compared with non-high-tech enterprises,high-tech enterprises' normal perks play a more significant role in promoting enterprise innovation investment,and the relationship between excessive perks and enterprise innovation investment is not significantly different between the two enterprises.As for the regulatory role of internal control,the regulatory role of internal control of non-state-owned enterprises and two-job separation enterprises is more significant.The possible innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly,from the perspective of implicit incentive perks,the impact of executive incentive on enterprise innovation is refined;secondly,this paper subdivides excess perks from the total perks,enriching the literature on on-the-job consumption;finally,the governance role of internal control is further discussed and its impact on excessive perks is discussed.The moderating role of the relationship between fees and R&D has broadened the research horizon of the economic consequences of internal control to a certain extent.