Research On The Influence Of Traditional Culture Norms On Executives' Excessive Perks Based On Different Ownership

In modern corporate governance,executives' perquisite consumption behavior is a common phenomenon.As a non-pecuniary incentive,perquisite consumption plays an alternative and complementary role to the monetary compensation incentive arrangement.It also occupied an important position in managers' incentive contract arrangements.Reasonable perquisite consumption can help improve company's economic performance.However,due to the incompleteness of the compensation contract and the lack of effective restraint mechanism,managers may use insidious perquisite consumption to optimize their personal economic utility,which will bring unreasonable perquisite consumption behavior and aggravate company's agency problem.Therefore,exploring and analyzing the governance factors that can regulate and constrain executives' excessive perquisite consumption are of great value for relieving the agent conflicts between managers and owners,which is also helpful for reducing the agency costs.In China's capital market,different ownerships will make the company face different formal regulatory constraints.And the existing researches that focus on excessive perquisite consumption also care more about examining the influence of different formal institutional factors such as laws and regulations,but little attention is paid to the potential impact of various informal and implicit social norms on managers' business ethical behaviors.Meanwhile,the relationships between formal supervisory governance mechanisms and informal traditional culture norms when influencing personal economic behaviors are also short of attention.Based on the principal-agent theory,new institutional economics theory,property right economic theory and path dependence theory,taking China's A-share non-financial listed companies as research samples from 2007 to 2016,setting executives' excessive perquisite consumption as the research object,and from the perspective of informal institution,this paper explores the role of traditional culture norms in the governance of executives' excessive perquisite under China's traditional culture and the moderation effect of ownership heterogeneity on the relationship between traditional culture norms and executives' excessive perquisite consumption.The results show that the implicit traditional culture norms can significantly mitigate executives' excessive perquisite consumption;and compared with state-owned enterprises that face strong formal supervision,traditional culture norms can significantly inhibit executives' excessive perquisite consumption in private enterprises.This indicates that the formal supervisory governance mechanism and informal traditional culture norms have complementary relationships when impacting the business ethical behavior of executives.Further research finds that the higher is the excessive perquisite consumption level of the company's managers,the greater is the implicit restraint of traditional culture norms.Based on the above research findings,this paper finally offers some proposals to strengthen the formal supervision and management of executives' behavior of listed companies,enhance the construction of corporate culture and the cultivation of managers' professional quality and business ethics and guide the positive role of informal institution in economic and social development.