Research On The Impact Of Equity-based Managerial Incentives On Corporate Risk-taking

Corporate risk-taking has an important impact on enterprise value,which to a large extent reflects the enterprise's choice of venture capital projects.Executives as the main decision makers of investment,have the important role of improving enterprise value and financial performance,and on the investment behavior of the produced by executives own effects on risk perception and acceptance,on the other hand in investment incentives of executives and eventually lead to investment behavior in this process will be restricted by the macroeconomic environment and influence.Executives as the main decision makers of business investment and the agency problem between shareholders will be tend to avoid risk.equity incentive as an effective alleviate the agency problem is the effective means to motivate executives,incentive effects on firms' investment behavior and the impact that on investment behavior is becoming more and more become the focus of scholars.At the end of 2005,China securities regulatory commission issued the equity incentive management measures for listed companies(trial),At the same time,the implementation of equity incentive system in China's listed companies overall investment conditions also present different characteristics,the study found that risk effect is better than stock options,restricted stock and stock option incentive effects than restricted stock,based on such background,this paper introduced senior wealth-returns volatility sensitivity(Vega)and executive wealth-price sensitivity(Delta)these two indicators to measure stock options and restricted stock option incentives that two types of equity incentive incentive intensity to the corporate risk-taking,In addition,the Vega value,an indicator of risk in option investment theory,is mainly considered to measure the effect of equity incentive on risk-taking.,and proposes the hypothesis,introduces the moderator variable of economic policy uncertainty on this basis,and expounds the hypothesis that economic policy uncertainty has different effects on the incentive effect of the two kinds of equity incentive methods.In the empirical aspect,this paper took the A-share listed companies that implemented stock option incentive or restricted equity incentive separately from 2006 to2015 as the research object,and tested the influence of different equity incentive methodson enterprise risk-taking and the moderating effect of economic policy uncertainty through non-equilibrium panel regression analysis.The main research conclusions are as follows :(1)The executive wealth-stock return volatility sensitivity(Vega)of stock option incentive,and the level of significance is relatively high.(2)The volatility sensitivity(Vega)of executive-wealth and share-price return of restricted equity incentive has a significant negative correlation with the level of corporate risk-taking,and the sensitivity(Delta)of executive-wealth and share-price has a positive correlation with the level of corporate risk-taking;(3)In the case of high uncertainty of economic policy,the positive correlation between stock option incentive and enterprise risk-taking level is enhanced.(4)In the case of high uncertainty of economic policy,the negative correlation between restricted equity incentive and enterprise risk bearing level is enhanced.