Related M&A,Internal Control And Excess Perquisite

The separation of ownership and management makes it possible for senior executives to spend perquisite.The diversity of forms and the non-compulsion of disclosure make the perquisite more hidden.In recent years,perquisite has become a new form of senior executives seeking welfare and even corruption.Excessive on-the-job consumption not only damages the interests of shareholders,restricts the development of the company,but also causes extravagance.Therefore,how to solve the problem of perquisite has attracted wide attention in academia.Compared with the accumulation of internal capital,M & A can bring many effects such as scale effect,market power effect,saving transaction cost and realizing the strategic goal of enterprise at the same time.M & A has obviously become an indispensable way for the development of enterprises.As a kind of merger and acquisition behavior among specific enterprises,related M & A also has the research value.In connected mergers and acquisitions,both parties belong to the same interest group,most of which are carried out in the environment of non-completely open competition,so whether the connected mergers and acquisitions will bring about positive impact,but also promote the opportunistic behavior of senior executives? Is the problem of perquisite more prominent in the case of connected mergers and acquisitions? What role will highquality internal control play in alleviating the problem of executive excess perquisite caused by related mergers and acquisitions?Based on the above problems,this paper selects the sample data of A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2017 to successfully complete the related mergers and acquisitions,discusses the problem of excess on-the-job consumption in affiliated mergers and acquisitions,and further studies the role of internal control system in regulating the relationship between the two.Through the combination of the literature analysis and the empirical analysis,the following conclusions are obtained:companies with related mergers and acquisitions will lead to more excess perquisite of senior executives,and this relationship is more prominent in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with centralized management power.Internal control can play an effective negative role in regulating the relationship between M & A and perquisite.The conclusion of this paper shows that when related mergers and acquisitions occur,we should focus on the excess perquisite of senior executives,monitor the effectiveness of internal control,and ensure the good performance of its governance role.In order to prevent associated M & A opportunism and false M & A phenomenon.