Study On The Impact Of Earnings Management On Investment Efficiency Of Agricultural Listed Companies In China

Earnings management is the operation behavior of enterprises to regulate profits,and the earnings information generated is an important reference factor for investors to invest.There are three situations of agency conflict:the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors,the agency conflict between shareholders and managers,and the agency conflict between large and small shareholders.The effect of earnings management caused by these conflicts is different,so the impact on investment behavior is different.The performance level of agricultural listed companies in China is low,the accounting efficiency of biological assets is poor,and the preferential policies enjoyed by the government are large.These characteristics make them have stronger motivation of earnings management and more convenient background.Moreover,agricultural listed companies have low returns in the investment field and lower investment level than other industries.It can be seen that the relationship between earnings management and investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies is more complex.Therefore,from the perspective of three kinds of agency conflicts,it has certain research significance to observe the impact of earnings management on inefficient investment of agricultural listed companies.This paper adopts the method of combining literature analysis and empirical research.Through sorting out and analyzing the representative literature at home and abroad,we are familiar with the current scholastical research on agency conflict,earnings management and investment behavior.We find that most scholars acknowledge that agency conflict is an important incentive for earnings management,and believe that earnings management will aggravate agency conflict and lead to inefficient investment.But most of these studies start from the conflict between shareholders and managers unilaterally.This paper studies the economic consequences of accrued earnings management without considering other agency conflicts and real earnings management,and the research object is all listed companies.Therefore,this paper expands the previous research direction,constructs a research framework based on basic theory,carries out theoretical analysis,and puts forward hypotheses on this basis.In the empirical research part,firstly,through collecting and collating financial documents such as annual reports and investment intentions,this paper makes a preliminary analysis of earnings management and investment level of agricultural listed companies.Secondly,Based on the three kinds of agency conflict,this paper establishes a model which accords with the characteristics of agricultural listed companies.According to the model,we choose the system GMM estimation or OLS regression analysis to test the impact of earnings management on inefficient investment under various circumstances.Finally,we draw the conclusion that accrued earnings management will increase the agency cost of creditor's rights and control rights,restrain effective investment,relieve the agency cost of creditor's rights and promote effective investment by real earnings management,alleviate the agency cost of equity and promote effective investment by accrued earnings management,increase the agency cost of equity and control rights by real earnings management,and restrain effective investment.According to the results of the study,some suggestions are put forward to improve the investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies:improving the quality of information disclosure and restraining opportunistic earnings management.Improve the quality of managers and allow reasonable earnings management.We will further improve the corporate governance structure and strengthen the management of agricultural projects.Improve the incentive system and promote benefit synergy.In order to improve the investment efficiency of agricultural listed companies and promote their long-term development to make a certain contribution.