Research On The Relationship Between Executive Incentives And Audit Quality

The research shows that salary management can restrain the excessive incentive of company executives in a short period of time,and the quality of the external independent audit has a significant impact on company executives ’compensation,but it still needs corresponding measures to counsel in the implementation process.In the process of rapid economic development,the investment efficiency of most enterprises in China has not increased accordingly with the increase of total investment in the market,and the problem of inefficient investment is widespread.On this basis,in order to build a perfect modern executive incentive mechanism,Enterprises can start from the supervision mechanism,which is due to the improved supervision can improve the quality and standards of corporate auditing,and further play a role in suppressing the short-term behavior of senior executives.In addition,according to China’s unique market system and economic background,it can be found that the difference of efficiency investment under different types of enterprises is relatively large,and the results will be different.To sum up,this paper focuses on the relationship between property rights,executive incentives,audit quality and inefficient investment.Based on the above main contents,this paper is divided into five chapters.In the first chapter,according to the current research background,the objectives and functions of this paper are put forward,and the relevant literature is sorted out and summarized.On this basis,the research framework and content of this paper are put forward,and the innovative points of this paper are introduced in detail.The second chapter summarizes the current situation of low investment efficiency in China,and briefly outlines the theoretical basis of this paper.Chapter three summarizes the principal-agent theory,incentive theory,information asymmetry theory and the connotation of executive incentive and audit quality,and puts forward the research hypothesis that corresponds to the theme of this paper.Chapter IV makes an empirical analysis of this paper,which mainly solves the following problems:(1)the relationship between executive incentives and audit quality;(2)the relationship between executive incentives and audit quality in the case of low investment efficiency;(3)the relationship between executive incentives and audit quality is different in listed companies with different property rights.(4)In the case of low investment efficiency,whether the relationship between executive incentives and audit quality of state-owned enterprises has changed.This paper uses 12125 sample data from 2009 to 2017.The empirical results show that there are over-investment and under-investment in China’s listed companies.In corporate governance,we should use appropriate executive incentives to improve audit quality,establish a sound audit supervision system,avoid collusion between senior managers and auditors,and optimize corporate governance.In order to solve the state-owned enterprise executive incentive"scoring system" problem,we can start from the relationship between executive compensation and audit quality.The last chapter of this paper lists the main conclusions of this study,and according to the research results,combined with China’s unique economic rules,on this basis,summarizes and plans the real and feasible suggestions for system construction,that is,to optimize the executive incentive rules,improve the audit monitoring system,and promote the upgrading of China’s investment structure.