Research On The Influence Of Executive Incentives On Non-efficiency Investment Under Different Property Rights

Investment decision-making is the core part of the enterprise's financial decision-making process.The efficiency of investment directly affects the business performance and survival of the enterprise,but the phenomenon of non-efficiency investment is common in enter:prises.The main reason for enterprises to generate non-efficiency investment is the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry caused by the separation of business operation rights and ownership.The principal-agent theory holds that by establishing an effective incentive mechanism,the interests of senior management and shareholders can be harmonized,so that executives can consider the long-term development of enterprises and the interests of shareholders when making investment decisions.As a pillar industry of China's national economy,manufacturing company's investment efficiency directly affects whether China's overall social resource allocation is reasonable and has a major impact on the operation of the macro economy.This paper adopts the research method combining literature research and empirical research,selects the manufacturing industry as the research sample,analyzes the relationship between executive incentives and enterprise non-efficiency investment under different property rights,and provide certain policy recommendations for companies to develop reasonable incentive programs.Firstly,based on the existing research results at home and abroad,combined with the principal-agent theory,incentive theory and other related theories,the research hypothesis of this paper is proposed.Secondly,select Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies as research samples,estimate the investment level of the sample companies in 2012-2017,and determine the degree of non-efficiency investment of enterprises according to model residuals;Then,according to the nature of property rights,multiple regression analysis is carried out to obtain the relationship between executive incentives and non-efficiency investments under different property rights.After empirical tests,it is found that in the listed companies in the manufacturing industry,the phenomenon of insufficient investment is more extensive,the degree of over-investment is more serious,and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is better than that of non-state-owned enterprises;the intensity of monetary compensation incentives can inhibit executives.Excessive investment and under-investment behavior,the implementation of equity incentives can effectively alleviate the degree of under-investment.After further analysis of the property rights,it is found that in manufacturing state-owned enterprises,monetary compensation incentives can alleviate excessive investment,and monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives can significantly inhibit the degree of underinvestment;In non-state-owned enterprises,monetary compensation incentives can alleviate excessive investment by enterprises,and equity incentives can significantly inhibit the degree of underinvestment.Finally,based on the research conclusions,the policy recommendations for improving the investment efficiency of manufacturing enterprises are proposed.