Empirical Study On The Influence Of Government Subsidy On The Investment Efficiency Of Listed Companies Iin Electric Power Industry

At present,most domestic enterprises have a very serious problem of 'high investment rate-low investment efficiency".In addition,investment plays a vital role in the development and progress of enterprises.As an important means of national macro-control,subsidies have a major impact on investment decisions and investment efficiency of power companies.Therefore,this paper chooses to explore the impact of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of listed companies in the power industry.This topic expands the research on the inefficient investment of enterprises,and provides a theoretical basis for further understanding of the effectiveness of the government in achieving effective allocation of resources.This paper selects the listed companies in the power industry from 2014 to 2018 as data samples,establishes the residual measurement model to measure the investment level of listed companies,then introduce the government subsidy variable into the residual measurement model.Through empirical analysis to determine the impact of government subsidies on corporate investment efficiency.The empirical results show that government subsidies can alleviate the company's insufficient investment to a certain extent,but it will also aggravate the company's excessive investment.The reliability of the empirical results is verified by a robustness test.Based on the analysis,this paper proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for the two main bodies of the company and the government.First,the company needs to use government subsidies reasonably and effectively,continuously improve the company's investment efficiency,reduce or even avoid the problem of insufficient investment and excessive investment;Second,the government needs to choose the target of government subsidies more fairly and openly.Government must strive to maximize the effectiveness of government subsidies,rather than using the political connection between company and government,using rent-seeking methods of the company's operators to make unreasonable distribution of social resources.The innovation of this paper is to combine the micro-behavior of the enterprise with the macro-econmic environment,establish a transmission mechanism from macro to micro,and provide a new research idea for deeper understanding of the investment efficiency of listed companies,that is,introduce government subsidy variables to explore the relationship between government subsidies and company investment efficiency.