Research On The Supervision Of Financial Fraud Of Listed Companies In China Based On Game Theory

In recent years,with the continuous development of social economy,the economic problems are also emerging.The former cases of fraud such as Enron and WorldCom in the United States,and the latter cases of fraud such as Wan Fu Sheng Ke,Wan Jiang Logistics and Sheng Jing Shan He in recent years in China are constantly giving us vigilance.But fraud is still happening.It is like destroying the white blood cells of platelets.If it is not regulated and stopped in time,it will threaten the healthy development of our "body"-the national economy for a long time.As far as China is concerned,since the reform and opening up,China's economic development has been rapid and the market economy has made gratifying achievements,which is a gratifying thing,because the economy directly reflects the strength of a country.However,the frequent occurrence of financial fraud in listed companies not only makes investors suffer losses,but also destroys the good economic operation of our country,hinders the development of our market economy,and has a negative impact on the country and society.As far as the practical significance of supervision is concerned,with the rapid economic development of our country,financial fraud of listed companies is becoming more and more serious.How to optimize supervision and supervise the listed companies effectively has important practical significance.This paper establishes a static game model of incomplete information between government supervision departments and issuing enterprises,accounting firms and issuing enterprises,accounting firms and government supervision departments.On the basis of discussing relevant parameters,the game model is constructed to obtain Nash equilibrium.It is concluded that the key to optimize the accounting supervision system in China is to enhance the intensity and efficiency of supervision,strengthen the re-supervision of government supervision departments,strengthen the re-supervision role of the media,optimize and control the supervision cost,and strengthen the punishment of accounting firms and issuing enterprises.Based on the introduction of related theories of financial fraud supervision of Listed Companies in China and the game theory,this paper constructs a game model from the perspective of static supervision game with incomplete information by using game theory analysis method,and probes into the supervision of financial fraud of Listed Companies in China with the case of Nine Top Group in Zhejiang Province.This paper tries to analyze the mixed game relationship among listed companies,supervisory authorities,namely the Securities Regulatory Commission,intermediary departments,that is,accounting firms,and reveal their behavior relationship.Then it finds the equilibrium solution and carries on the model test,and draws the conclusion of game analysis.Finally,it puts forward some suggestions for improving the accounting supervision of Listed Companies in China.