Research On Game Of Government Regulators,accounting Fraud Enterprises And Cpa

In recent years,the problem of accounting fraud showed much more serious than before.The case of accounting fraud appears frequently. People concern its extent and big harmfulness, It made impact to capital markets so the public,investors,accountants,academics,and regulators pay more attention on it. The case of accounting fraud appears frequently lead to unprecedented credit crisis in stock market, and made significant damage to Chinese economic. Seriously hindered the healthy development of China's economic market.Firstly, This article summaries the domestic and international literature on the broad, analyses the research status and research background, and then leads to the research significance. It made foundation in theory for model by explaining the definition and main mode of accounting fraud and its harmfulness,This article uses game theory research methods, first of all it use game theory to analyse the relationship between accounting fraud enterprises and government regulation department, and then reveals the motivations and game equilibrium of accounting fraud enterprises and government regulation department. We find improving government supervision increasing penalties on companies,reduce the cost of government regulation,and increasing government regulation of compensation can reduce the probability of the fraud conclusion. The article analyses the relationship of accounting fraud enterprises and CPA with Game Theory and obtained the game equilibrium during both results, the governance of fraud enterprise is close to audit of CPA, Certified Public Accountant can clearly understand the listed company's financial condition, results of operations and cash flows, or even trade secrets in the audit process, but the government do not understand whether the certified public accountants cooperate with enterprises. Therefore it is very important to concerned with the relationship of accounting fraud enterprises and CPA. Increasing the compensation of CPA can reduce the probability of cooperation. Basis in the first two sub-models the article builds tripartite game model of the government regulators, accounting fraud enterprise and CPA, and reveals the motivations and the game equilibrium. It shows in a given institutional arrangement, selecting the behavior of individual actors and their interaction mechanism is of great importance. Obtained the factors affecting the accounting fraud, and proposed to strengthen the legal system and other corresponding measures to increase penalties.