Research Of The Enterprise Rent-seeking's Impact On R&D Subsidies' Effect

Technological innovation is an important driving force for economic growth.Due to the high risk and positive externalities of technological innovation,it may lead to “market failure”.In order to encourage enterprises to carry out research and development activities to promote technological innovation,governments have formulated a series of related policies to make up for this “market failure” phenomenon.Among them,promoting enterprise innovation through R&D subsidies is an important policy measure.However,while the scale of R&D subsidies is increasing,on the one hand,the amount of granted patent which is considered as R&D output has achieved explosive growth and is ranked first in the world.On the other hand,there is still a certain gap between China's R&D and innovation levels and major developed countries' in view of the innovation index like the amounts of three-party patents.Then the effect of China's R&D subsidies has become a problem we need to pay attention to.Through the combing and induction of the previous literature,it is found that the implementation effect of R&D subsidies to promote technological innovation of enterprises has not yet formed a consistent judgment.At present,scholars mainly studied the effects of R&D subsidies by following the idea that R&D subsidies have an impact on corporate innovation.,but this logic ignores the possibility of companies seeking rent from the government to obtain R&D subsidies.Under the assumption of maximizing corporate profits,the rent-seeking activities that enterprises pursue for profit will have an important impact on the R&D subsidy effect.Based on the above reasons,this paper studies the impact of rent-seeking behavior on the R&D subsidy effect from both theoretical and empirical aspects.Firstly,the company's R&D,production and profit are included in a unified framework,and the optimal solution of the two types of enterprises in the face of R&D subsidies under the assumption of profit maximization is studied.Further,this paper studies the mechanism of the impact of rent-seeking behavior on the R&D subsidy effect.On this basis,this paper uses the microdata of listed companies to conduct empirical research to examine the effect of R&D subsidies and the impact of corporate rent-seeking on the R&D subsidy effect,which will help us to re-examine the possible rentseeking in the R&D subsidy process and its effects.So it provides suggestions for relevant policy reforms,and at the same time it explains to some extent the causes of different conclusions in the relevant literature on the effects of R&D subsidies and the “patent bubble” phenomenon in the real world.This paper finally forms the following main conclusions:Firstly,the relationship between R&D subsidies and corporate R&D output is studied through theoretical derivation and empirical testing.The results show that the increase in R&D subsidies can promote the increase of R&D output,especially the increase in patent amounts.Secondly,the empirical test examines the relationship between enterprise rent-seeking and R&D subsidy effects.The results show that enterprise rent-seeking will promote the increase of patent amounts,but will not promote the improvement of patent quality.The conclusions are still significant after grouping enterprises by region.