A Research On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge On Corporate Performance

This paper combines normative research and empirical research methods,considers the impact of corporate ownership types on equity pledge and the adjustment of equity concentration,and explores the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on company performance.Firstly,it introduces the background of the topic and the research ideas of the full text,and points out the research significance and innovation deficiencies of this paper.Then,it sorts out the related literature,and the relationship between equity pledge and company performance,the controlling shareholder equity financing preference of different types of enterprises The influence of equity concentration on the relationship between company performance and equity pledge is the core,summarizing and summarizing the current research on these contents at home and abroad.Third,using the relevant data of the equity pledge of A-share listed companies in2014-2018,combined with the new rules of stock market changes and equity pledges in China,taking the chart as the main form of presentation,the rules and institutional evolution of equity pledge transactions,the scale of transactions,A series of studies and summaries of the number of closed positions,industry distribution,and type of business types.Fourthly,it analyzes the motives,risks,benefits and equity concentration of equity pledge on the relationship between equity pledge and company performance,and summarizes the relevant theories.It believes that the type of enterprise significantly affects the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior,non-state-owned Enterprises are more inclined to carry out equity pledge financing,and the impact of equity pledge on company performance needs to be further empirically tested in conjunction with the adjustment of equity concentration.Finally,the annual panel data of all A-share listed companies in 2014-2017 is selected as a sample.The method of multiple regression and stratified regression is used to empirically study the impact of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders of state-owned,private and foreign-funded enterprises on the company's performance,and the corresponding policy recommendations are given based on the empirical results.Through the analysis of current situation,theoretical research and empirical test,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)The controlling entrant of the controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises is not strong,and the proportion of equity pledge is low,although the controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises participating in equity pledge in recent years Gradually increased,but this ratio has not exceeded 15%.Non-public ownership of private foreign-invested enterprises and other controlling shareholders have strong preference for equity pledge.The pledge preference of controlling shareholders of foreign-funded enterprises is slightly inferior to that of private enterprises.However,due to strong demand for financing,the two also tend to carry out a high proportion of equity pledge.(2)Equity pledge of controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises has no significant impact on corporate performance.On the one hand,even if the controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises conducts equity pledge,political relations will weaken the governance role of equity pledge,and the controlling shareholder's motivation to improve company performance is not strong;on the other hand,state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders choose less high-value equity pledge,equity The pledge has no obvious effect on the expansion of the separation of the two powers and will not deepen the agency problem.(3)The equity pledge of the controlling shareholder of private enterprises has a negative impact on the company's performance.Under other conditions,the increase of the concentration of equity can weaken this negative impact,but it cannot completely change the negative relationship between the two.The equity pledge has increased the motive of the controlling shareholder's short-selling of the company's interests.However,as the concentration of equity increases,the interests of the controlling shareholder and the company's interests are more convergent,which weakens the motive to a certain extent.(4)The equity pledge behavior of the controlling shareholder of a foreign-funded enterprise will also reduce the performance of the enterprise.The improvement of the concentration of equity will help improve the performance of the company.However,the effect of equity concentration on the infringement of the company's performance is not significant.