Research On Management Opportunistic Behavior In Equity Incentive

In order to solve the contradiction of principal-agent in modern enterprises,equity incentive came into being and were widely applied and popularized.In 2005,regulations and policies related to equity incentive were introduced one after another.The number of listed companies implementing equity incentive plans in China increased year by year,indicating that equity incentive have achieved good results in reducing agency costs and improving company performance.However,in the implementation of the number of equity incentive companies,in recent years,there have been many cases in which China's management has conducted opportunistic behavior under equity incentive.The design and implementation of equity incentive in some listed companies are accompanied by unreasonable factor design.Problems such as opportunistic behavior and earnings management have led to the weakening of the incentive effect of equity incentive,which has become a tool for management's profit and infringement on the interests of small and medium shareholders.On this basis,it is of great significance to study the opportunistic behavior of management under equity incentive.The paper is divided into five parts.The first part is the introduction,which mainly introduces the research background and significance of this paper,as well as the research ideas,framework,research methods and contributions of this paper.The second part is the literature review and theoretical basis.The literature review part collects and studies the related research on equity incentive and management opportunistic behaviors at home and abroad,from the effects of equity incentive,the influencing factors of incentive effects,the influencing factors and behavioral modes of management opportunistic behavior under equity incentive.The paper summarizes and comments on the literature;the theoretical basis combs the core ideas of rational economic man hypothesis,principal-agent theory and management power theory,and provides theoretical basis for the subsequent theoretical analysis.The third part is conceptual definition and theoretical analysis.The concept definition section defines the core concepts of this paper.The theoretical analysis part first analyzes the conditions of opportunistic behavior.From this background,it analyzes the purpose of opportunistic behavior and specific opportunistic behavior,and summarizes the specific manifestation and production of opportunistic behavior.The effect,and combing its mechanism of action,laid the foundation for case analysis.The fourth part is the case study.This part selects the case of the equity incentive of Jiaozuo Wanfang Aluminum Manufacturing Co.,Ltd.Firstly,the case background is introduced from three aspects: company profile and background,equity incentive plan and implementation process and implementation consequences of equity incentive.Secondly,from the perspective of internal corporate governance and external supervision,the conditions of opportunistic behavior are analyzed in combination with the case.Finally,it judges the five methods of impact draft design,earnings management,non-efficiency investment,opportunistic timing,and profit distribution,and conducts an in-depth analysis of the specific performance and effects of each method.The sixth part draws conclusions and makes targeted recommendations for effectively preventing management opportunistic behavior.This paper focuses on the conditions,methods and consequences of management opportunistic behavior under the equity incentive of Jiaozuo Wanfang Aluminum Manufacturing Co.,Ltd.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Under the incentive of equity,when the internal governance structure of the company is imperfect and the external supervision is relaxed,the management has opportunistic behavior,including affecting the design of equity incentive,earnings management,inefficient investment,opportunistic timing and impact on profit distribution.(2)Different opportunistic behaviors will have different effects.Influencing draft design,earnings management and non-efficiency investment can help management to reduce the difficulty of performance evaluation,opportunistic timing and affecting profit distribution can help management to improve equity incentive income.(3)Excessive control of management,lack of governance of institutional investors,policy changes and regulatory relaxation after property rights changes provide conditions for management to implement opportunistic behavior under equity incentive.(4)Under the incentive of equity,management conducts opportunistic behavior and weakens the long-term incentive effect of equity incentives,which will not only harm the interests of small and medium shareholders,but also affect the long-term development of the company.The expected contributions of this paper are as follows: 1.This paper combines theory with case studies to deeply analyze the conditions,specific methods of management opportunistic behavior under equity incentive in the case,which is more intuitive than empirical research and enriches management under equity incentive.Research on the case of the opportunistic behavior case.Second,through the case study of Jiaozuo Wanfang Aluminum Manufacturing Co.,Ltd,this paper puts forward suggestions for improving the design of equity incentive plan,internal corporate governance structure and external supervision,so as to better prevent and restrict the opportunistic behavior of management.The internal governance and external supervision of enterprises provide useful reference for promoting the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises.