Research On Opportunistic Behavior And Governance Mechanism Of R&d Alliance System

R&D alliance is a netw ork organization which formed by two or m ore than two enterprises, and these enterprises do R&D works together、results will be directly to the members and the commercialization of the results, also by agreement、contract and form complementary advantages and ris k sharing. R&D allian ce can help enterprises particular high technology enterprises to achieve low cost、high efficiency, also shorten the development cycle of new products a nd new technology, so it has been widely developed in competitive markets and the env ironment of demand changing markets, and became the main organization style of modern enterprise to research or creation. In the R&D alliance, the principal of complementary of technology and resulting from the division of labor and specialization determines the deepening division of labor, which is the important way to promote the accumulation of professional knowledge and improve the economic performance of enterprises. However, R&D alliance as a cross boundary of inter firm cooperation system, knowledge and technology sharing will produce th e effect of overflowing, and doesn’ t have the traditional hierarchy enterprise’s coordination mechanism, the alliance has no complex contract, th erefore cannot be to clear contracts to determ ine their rights and responsibilities, so the opportunistic behavior has happened in the process of cooperation, and it greatly increased the endogenous transaction cost. A ccording to the theory of stability’s boundary, if the endogenous transaction costs exceed the external transaction cost of the alliance, the alliance will be in a high degree of instab ility. So, in the case of rapid developm ent of R&D alliance, it is im portant to explore the facts and m echanism of its development, and to make clear its governance mechanism, which is of great significance to promote the development of it.The main purpose of this paper is to an alysis the opportunistic behaviors of R&D alliance and find an ef fective governance mechanism to i mprove the development of R&D alliance. The paper indicates that the R&D alliance is based on the transformation of knowledge or technology, the formal contract is necessarily incomplete because of the confidential of knowledge of technology, and this formal contract regulate by such as court “the third party” has high exogenous transaction cost in the environm ent of confidential knowledge. So, the tradition al formal governance bas ed on the co re of contract has great lim itations, and the func tion of equity is outstanding, based this background, this paper introduce the formal governance at the core of equity incentives. But it cannot com pletely avoid the occurren ce probability of oppor tunistic behavior, so the role of informal governance as a complement to formal governance is highlighted. So this paper introduces the reputation govern ance based on the future value, in this mechanism, it is benefit for alliance members to get “self-enforcement” and improve the cooperation quality of R&D alliance.Therefore, this paper modeling analysis two m echanism in the fram ework of non-cooperative game theory, discuss the equ ity incentive and reputation incentive to prevention and governance m echanism for a lliance member’s opportunistic behavior. And detailed analysis the effect of the ke ep the stab ility of alliance members of the firm’s optimal equity share and the releva nt parameters; discussed under the reputation mechanism effectively circumvent the alliance member companies of the opportunistic behavior mechanism and related parameters of the effect. Finally based on the analysis, this paper put forward the governance mechanism of the opportunistic behavior of R&D alliance, which is based on the combination of formal governance(equity incentive) and informal governance(reputation incentive).The conclusion of the study shows that the equity incentive as the core of the formal governance, giving the equity to the alliance member which beneficial to avoid the opportunistic behavior, enhance the degree of R&D effort. And this optimal equity share is existence in the theory. At the same time, this optimal equity will be effected by the member’s risk av ersion coefficient、technical resource investm ent、the cost coefficient of R&D and the uncertain ty of market environm ent. And the m odel of informal governance based on the reputati on mechanism conclude th at increase the numbers of cooperation、discount factor and penalty fact or exert a positive ef fect for behavior of alliance m ember, it promote that keep the reputation rent to the end can effectively reduce the opportunistic behavior. On the ba se of analysis, this paper proposed the comprehensive governance mechanism of reputation and equity, and this paper enriched the research of strategic allian ce and provide a powerful theoretical guidance for the Chinese enterprises, especially the high-tech enterprise alliance.