Research On The Application Of Shareholding-increasing In Equity Pledge Risk Response

In recent years,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior has become more frequent,and the proportion of pledges has become higher and higher,which has led to various equity pledge risks.In the face of the risks brought by equity pledge,listed companies have adopted different risk response measures,such as supplementary pledge,shareholding-increasing,trading halts and so on.Among these methods,the shareholding-increasing in the secondary market as an important shareholder behavior in the capital market,its application process and coping effect in the risk response of equity pledge has become a hot issue for listed companies.Therefore,this paper will combine the equity pledge risk of listed companies,analyze the application time,proportion and response effect of shareholding-increasing,in order to help listed companies understand the application and effectiveness of shareholding-increasing in equity pledge risk response and choose the most effective risk response.This paper focuses on the application of the two types of shareholding-increasing.Firstly,make the theoretical analysis by summarizing the results of the domestic and foreign research,combined with the theory of control rights,signal transmission theory and market timing theory.Secondly,taking Europol Intelligent Network Co.,Ltd.as the case analysis object,analyzing the risk of equity pledge currently facing it,and analyzing the two ways of increasing holdings adopted by Europol Intelligent Network Co.,Ltd..Finally,the relevant policy recommendations are proposed in conjunction with the conclusions of this paper.This paper gets the following two main conclusions:(1)The different types of equity pledge risk faced by the controlling shareholder affect the timing of the application of the increase,while the proportion of the increase is affected by the pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder and the level of financial constraints.(2)In the short-term,the two kinds of shareholding increase behaviors have a certain positive mitigation effect on the stock price decline risk in the equity pledge risk,and the risk response effect of the “ "risk-free" shareholding-increasing” is better.The effect of corporate governance risk is related to the level of corporate governance after the shareholding-increasing.(3)The motivation of shareholding-increasing in the equity pledge risk response are affected by the nature of shareholders.The application of shareholding-increasing is often based on “self-protection motivation” and “time-scheduled motivation”,especially for the controlling shareholder who is in the absolute control of the private enterprise.The innovation of this paper is to combine the two kinds of shareholder behaviors----equity pledge and shareholding-increasing,enriching the theoretical research on the major shareholder's shareholding-increasing.At the same time,it also deeply analyzes a new way of increasing shareholding in the capital market----"risk-free" shareholding-increasing,adding a theoretical foundation to this concept.In addition,this paper focuses on the application process and application effect of shareholding increase in equity pledge risk,and provides practical basis and practical significance for listed companies in the equity pledge risk response from the application time point,proportion and effect of the increase.In this way,the listed company can identify its own equity pledge risk and find a suitable risk response method.Since this paper analyzes only through one case,the general applicability of the research conclusions has yet to be verified and tested.And long-term follow-up analysis should also be taken in the future.