| With the continuous development of China's capital market,corporate financing methods and channels are increasingly diversified.Equity pledge is a way of obtaining loans from the capital market through the pledge of rights(using the pledge of equity held by the pledgor).It is low in capital cost,large in financing amount,convenient in operation,and pledge does not involve transfer of control rights.The characteristics are favored by many shareholders.Before 2013,Chinese listed companies could only pledged off-site.On June 24,2013,the Shanghai Stock Exchange officially launched the stock pledged repo business.Subsequently,there was a large-scale on-market pledge in the A-share market,and the scale of equity pledge of A-share listed companies showed explosive growth.The outside world uses “no stocks and no loans” to describe the current phenomenon of equity pledge in China's A-share market.Equity pledge financing,although low in cost and convenient in operation,can alleviate financing constraints to a certain extent,but there are also potential risks such as transfer of corporate control rights,short-selling listed companies by major shareholders,and illegal use of funds.If the equity pledge risk cannot be properly handled,it will inevitably affect the stability and health of the capital market.The 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to resolutely fight against major risks and prevent major risks.Preventing financial risks is one of the key objectives of winning the battle to prevent and resolve major risks.It is particularly important to actively prevent the risk of controlling the pledge.At present,the research on equity pledge is not rich enough.This is in contrast to the frequent occurrence of equity pledge in the practice community.The theoretical research on equity pledge has lagged behind the development of economic behavior.Therefore,it is necessary to further explore the internal mechanism of the economic consequences of equity pledge in order to deal with risks.In the macroeconomic field,optimizing resource allocation and improving resource allocation efficiency are eternal topics in the economic field.In the microeconomic field,investment activities are an important part of the survival and development of enterprises.Enterprise investment efficiency has always been a hot topic in the field of finance and economics.Previous studies have shown that corporate investment efficiency is affected by factors such as information asymmetry,principal-agent problems,and corporate governance.Because the majority shareholder has control over the enterprise,its behavior usually has a greater impact on the enterprise.The controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior is likely to affect the investment decision of the enterprise and affect the investment efficiency of the enterprise.At present,there is little literature on the relationship between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and investment efficiency.This paper will research this.This paper analyzes the role of major shareholders in corporate finance and investment decision-making from the perspective of major shareholder behavior,and explores the mechanism of controlling shareholder pledge affecting investment efficiency by combining the differences in property rights.In further research,this paper is also based on the use of equity pledge funds.Differences explore whether there is a difference in the impact of equity pledges for different capital uses.The significance of this paper is:(1)It helps to deepen the understanding of the behavior,consequences and risk response of major shareholders and enrich the research in this field.(2)Provide theoretical basis for the government supervision department to prevent the risk of equity pledge,design and improve the protection mechanism of investors' interests,and at the same time,the author also put forward some policy recommendations.(3)It helps small and medium-sized shareholders,pledgeeers and other corporate stakeholders to identify and respond to risks.Based on the theory of information asymmetry,principal-agent theory and financing constraint theory,the economic consequences caused by the controlling shareholder's equity pledge have two sides.On the one hand,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge will lead to(1)exacerbate the separation of control rights and cash flow rights,and worsen the problem of the size of the shareholders;(2)change the shareholder risk appetite and aggravate the agency conflict between creditors and major shareholders;Strengthening the correlation between stock price and personal interest,and enhancing the motive of raising stock price,which makes the controlling shareholder with control of listed company more likely to inefficient investment behavior for the purpose of seeking private profits and mainly over-investment.On the other hand,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge can alleviate the financial dilemma and reduce the degree of information asymmetry,which helps to alleviate the lack of investment.Whether the controlling shareholder's equity pledge affects the investment efficiency of the enterprise will have any impact,which is the core issue of this paper.Research on modern enterprise theory has proved that enterprise property rights arrangements will have a significant impact on the agency costs and business performance of enterprises.In the enterprises with different property rights,whether there is a difference in the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and investment efficiency is the second issue of this paper.The negative economic consequences of equity pledge behavior are largely due to the divestiture of funds.In further research,this paper analyzes whether there is a difference in the impact of equity pledges for different capital uses based on the difference in the use of equity pledge funds,trying to explore equity pledge The intrinsic link between the use of funds and economic consequences.This paper takes the A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as research samples from 2008 to 2017.From the perspective of investment behavior of large shareholders,this paper studies the relationship between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and corporate investment decisions,and analyzes the internal mechanism of controlling shareholders' equity pledges affecting corporate investment efficiency..The study found that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge is significantly positively correlated with over-investment,and is significantly negatively correlated with the lack of investment.Further research found that in private enterprises,compared with enterprises that do not have controlling shareholder pledge,there is excessive investment of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge.More serious,there is no evidence that the controlling shareholder pledge has a significant relationship with the lack of investment.In state-owned enterprises,there is no evidence that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge is significantly related to excessive investment or insufficient investment.The conclusions of this paper indicate that the influence of controlling shareholder pledge on investment efficiency has two sides.On the one hand,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge is overly positively correlated with investment,which reduces investment efficiency;on the other hand,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge is negatively correlated with insufficient investment,thus improving investment efficiency.In general,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge tends to expand the investment scale to control more resources,which provides evidence for the controlling shareholder to encroach on the listed company's resources,and also provides a direction for corporate governance research. |
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