Research On The Impact Of Institutional Investors' Shareholdings On Listed Company Efficiency Of Investment

In the operation of the enterprise,the investment is at the center,but the nonefficiency investment is widespread in the daily operation,which restricts the development of the enterprise and reduces the efficiency of the capital market.The organization's external governance functions and information advantages can effectively alleviate the two types of incentives that cause inefficient investment-"information asymmetry" and "agent problem." In view of the positive significance of the development of institutional investors,the CSRC introduced institutional investors in 2000,but the development still has a gap with the developed capital market.In addition,China's capital market is not a strong and effective market,and some institutional investors will have irrational investment behavior.Therefore,some scholars have questioned whether Chinese institutional investors have the effect of improving the investment efficiency of listed companies.This makes it necessary for research institutional investors to share the impact on the investment efficiency of listed companies in China.This paper selects the financial data of the A-share non-financial listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and the institutional investors' shareholding ratio data from 2011 to 2017,and depicts the institutional investors from the perspectives of institutional shareholding ratio,independence and stability.The characteristics of stocks,construct a regression model,and study the role of institutional investors in improving the investment efficiency of listed companies.In addition,the predecessors' research has little research on the influencing factors of the abovementioned effects.This paper explores three adjustment variables of “agent cost”,“executive equity incentive” and “equity concentration” to explore the regulatory effects of internal corporate governance factors.The empirical results show that the institutional shareholding ratio,independence and shareholding stability all have a restraining effect on the excessive investment behavior of the enterprise,but cannot inhibit the underinvestment behavior,and have the effect of improving the investment efficiency of the listed company as a whole.In terms of regulation effect test,in the inhibition effect of institutional shareholding ratio on listed companies' excessive investment behavior,executive equity incentives will strengthen this inhibition,and agency costs and equity concentration will weaken this inhibition.In the inhibition of institutional independence on the excessive investment behavior of listed companies,executive equity incentives will aggravate this inhibition,while excessive equity concentration will weaken this inhibition;in the institutional holding stability of listed companies In the inhibition of excessive investment behavior,executive equity incentives will aggravate this inhibition,and agency costs and excessive equity concentration will weaken this inhibition.