Research On The Impact Of The Co-existence Of Multiple Large Shareholders On The Investment Efficiency Of Enterprises

Investment behavior plays a very important role in the economic activities of enterprises.The level of investment efficiency directly affects the future development of enterprises.Efficient investment can not only enhance the comprehensive competitiveness of enterprises,but also help rationally allocate social resources and promote the economic development of the whole society.The non-efficiency investment behavior damages the interests of shareholders and enterprises,and it is also a waste of social resources.Therefore,how to improve investment efficiency is an urgent problem to be solved by the theoretical and practical circles.Researches have shown that the efficiency of corporate investment will be affected by the company’s shareholding structure.However,the current domestic and foreign scholars’ are mainly concerned with a monopoly and a diversified shareholding structure,and there are few studies on the shareholding structure of multiple large shareholders.Nowadays,multiple large shareholders have become a relatively common shareholding structure in the enterprise.Does this kind of shareholding structure have an impact on corporate investment?Compared with a single large shareholder,are multiple large shareholders more conducive to improving the efficiency of corporate investment? When there are multiple large shareholders at the same time,the company will show mutual supervision among shareholders or conspiracy of shareholders,and it is still to be tested and verified through empirical research.This thesis takes Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research object of China’s A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017.The residuals of the Richardson investment expectation model are used to measure the investment efficiency of the company.The shareholders who hold more than 10% of the shares are defined as large shareholders.The shares of the concerted person are combined and calculated as shares of a shareholder。The OLS regression model is used to verify the relationship between multiple large shareholders and the investment efficiency of enterprises,and further examines the impact of the number of large shareholders,the relative strength of shareholdings and the dispersion of equity on investment efficiency.Finally,it also analyzes the regulatory role played by corporate governance and property rights.The thesis results show that:(1)Multiple large shareholders have a positive effect on the investment efficiency of enterprises.In order to enhance persuasiveness,this thesis alsodivides the sample into over-investment and under-investment,respectively,and the results are still valid.(2)When there are multiple large shareholders in an enterprise,they usually show mutual supervision rather than collusion.This may be because this article regards the concerted action person as one shareholder.To the greatest extent,there is no consistent action relationship between large shareholders,so the collusion motivation is weak.(3)Other large shareholders can form equity checks and balances,thereby improving the efficiency of corporate investment.In this thesis,the strength of other large shareholders is measured by the number of large shareholders,the relative strength of shareholding and the equity dispersion.The results show that other large shareholders can form supervision and balance on the largest shareholder,thus improving investment efficiency.(4)Multiple large shareholders can play a stronger role when the mechanism of corporate governance is poor.The research results show that when the level of internal and external governance is poor,multiple large shareholders can play a more prominent supervisory role and improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.(5)Multiple large shareholders can alleviate the information asymmetry of state-owned enterprises,thereby improving the efficiency of enterprise investment.Due to the “owner’s absence” of state-owned enterprises,the agency agglomeration makes information asymmetry more serious,and management may interfere with corporate investment behavior because of private interests.Multiple large shareholders can alleviate information asymmetry,thereby improving the efficiency of corporate investment.