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Equity Pledge Of Large Shareholders,Investment Efficiency,Listed Company Performance

Posted on:2020-12-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y F ZhuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330623452509Subject:economics
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In recent years,the equity pledge of Chinese A-share listed companies has been very frequent.Due to the lack of strict supervision by the regulatory authorities on the pledge of the shareholding of the large shareholders of listed companies,the large shareholder may invest the pledge funds to third parties and increase the risk of separation of the two powers.At present,A-share listed companies are almost in a state of“no stocks and no pledge".The risks and consequences caused by the high shareholding pledge of large shareholders have gradually emerged.In 2018,many listed companies' equity pledges have involved default and suffered passive reductions,which affect the company's stock price and performance.This paper takes the relationship between large shareholders' equity pledge,investment efficiency and corporate performance as the research object.Based on the data of listed companies in China's A-share market in 2013-2017,the relationship between the three is studied.The structural equation model(SEM)is used to study the mediating effect of investment efficiency between equity pledge and firm performance.Firstly,based on the principal-agent theory,control gain theory,information asymmetry theory,financing constraint theory,free cash flow hypothesis,mediation effect theory and other foundations,the research hypothesis is established.Secondly,the relevant indicators of equity pledge and corporate performance were established,and the Richardson investment model was used to measure the investment efficiency.Finally,in order to study the correlation between the three and the mediating effect of investment efficiency,a regression model and a structural equation model were established and empirical analysis was carried out.The study found that:first,the increase in the proportion of large shareholders' equity pledge will lead to the deterioration of corporate performance;second,the increase in the proportion of large shareholders' equity pledge will lead to an increase in non-efficiency investment,that is,the reduction of investment efficiency;third,the non-efficiency investment The increase,that is,the reduction of investment efficiency,will lead to the deterioration of corporate performance.Fourth,the investment efficiency has a partial mediating effect between the shareholding pledge ratio of large shareholders and corporate performance,and the mediating effect of excessive investment is more obvious than the underinvestment.
Keywords/Search Tags:equity pledge of large shareholders, investment efficiency, mediating effect, structural equation model
PDF Full Text Request
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