Game Theoretic Analysis On Financial Fraud Of Listed Companies,Auditors And Regulatory Authority

In recent years,China's capital market has achieved rapid growth,and the securities market is also developing rapidly.However,the relevant systems have not been perfected along with the development speed.In the process of development,there are still some unavoidable problems,such as financial fraud.China's capital market is endless.We need to understand the causes of financial fraud in a number of different ways,and then find a corresponding solution and improvement.The paper first analyzes the current situation of financial fraud in foreign countries and extends it to domestic financial fraud.Based on the theory,combined with the financial fraud situation of China's capital market and China's special national conditions,the research has made certain achievements in the cause of fraud and prevention and control.This paper adopts a combination of normative research and empirical research to systematically study the financial reporting fraud of listed companies in China.The normative research mainly uses the main theoretical game theory of economics to analyze the causes and motives of financial report fraud.The empirical research mainly confirms the conclusion of theoretical analysis through JYKJ financial fraud case analysis method.It is hoped that through the combination of normative research and empirical research,the policy recommendations for financial reporting fraud in China are proposed.Finally,through the game analysis of the cases,the countermeasures of financial fraud governance are obtained: to strengthen the punishment and supervision of financial fraud;Standardizing the business relationship between listed companies and external auditors;Improve the supervision system of financial fraud and delisting system;Establish and perfect the incentive and restraint system of the management to speed up the construction of the credit system from these four aspects to control financial fraud.