Research On The Control Competition And Consequences Of KONKA Group

The second type of principal-agent problem in China is serious,because of relatively concentrated shareholding structure.With the development of China's capital market the equity of listed companies in China tends to be decentralized.Under this background,the competition for control of listed companies frequently occurs,which aroused widespread concern in the academic community and the domestic public.The competition for control rights will affect the performance of the company and the development of the capital market.Therefore,systematic research on control rights competition can provide reference value for improving corporate governance efficiency and promoting capital market development.This paper selects KONKA Group,a special case of the first small and mediumsized shareholders win control rights in China's capital market.On the basis of analyzing the process of control rights competition,combined with the principalagent theory and the private-income of control rights theory,this paper analyzes the affecting factors,reasons and consequences of the competition between state-owned controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.The study found that the deeper factor affecting the stability of its control is the ownership structure,but the factors that play an important role in the competition are social capital and institutional environment;the fundamental reason for small and medium-sized shareholders to compete for control is to protect their rights and interests,but the impact on KONKA Group is negative.Therefore,this paper proposes targeted recommendations to protect investor rights and stable control rights from the aspects of optimizing internal corporate governance and improving the external institutional environment.This paper studies the conflicts between state-owned controlling shareholders and small & medium shareholders.On the one hand,it broadens the applicability of the existing analysis framework for control issues.On the other hand,it provides a useful reference for similar state-owned enterprises to improve corporate governance and stable control rights.At the same time,it also provides some suggestions for the relevant regulatory departments of China's securities market to improve laws and regulations and protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders.