Research On Small And Medium-size Shareholders Selection Of Independent Directors To Participate In Corporate Governance

The interest protection of investors,especially small and medium investors,has become the focus of the academic and practical circles.A large number of domestic and foreign scholars have studied the interest protection of small and medium investors.In the practice sector,cases of damage to the equity of small and medium shareholders have frequently occurred.With the introduction of an independent director system for the protection of small and medium shareholders,Chinese scholars have conducted in-depth research and the research findings are also controversial.Some studies have shown that the independent director system has a positive effect on corporate governance.However,some studies have shown that the system of independent directors in our country needs to be improved and the functions performed have not achieved the expected results.This article will start from the source of independent director selection,and further improve the existing research direction through in-depth analysis of cases.Based on the theory of the ownership structure and the principal-agent,this paper analyzes the motivation,conditions and effects of the small and medium shareholders'participation in corporate governance through the detailed process of control over Konka Group's control.This paper analyzes the supervision motives of small and medium shareholders for the selection of independent directors and their positive effects on corporate governance through a combination of case studies and comparative studies,as well as quantitative and qualitative research methods.The positive role is to restrain the self-interest of the large shareholders to a certain extent,and improve the quality of accounting information effectively.At the same time,it also supervises the self-interest behavior of managers and tries to improve the company's compensation system.However,there are also limitations in the governance process of independent directors,which is manifested in their failure to actively perform duties and their inaccurate role orientation.In response to the existing problems,the paper proposes suggestions for improving the selection and employment of independent directors,improving the application of the cumulative voting system,and improving the incentive and restraint mechanisms for independent directors'compensation.Through the article,we hope to contribute some theoretical knowledge to the academic research on the governance effect of independent directors,and also provide a reference for small and medium investors to protect their own rights and interests.At the same time,it also provides reference for listed companies and promotes the healthy and stable development of listed companies in China.