The Impact Of Stock Pledge And Shareholding Ratio Of Major Shareholders On The Risk Of Corporate Stocks Crash

The introduction of the "New Regulations on Reduction of Shares" policy is an external shock,studying the relationship between creditor governance and stock market crash risks,and further studying the impact mechanism of creditor governance and stock market collapse risks.The author has compiled relevant research findings on past share price crashes.Many scholars believe that stock crashes can be divided into internal situations and external situations.Among them,the most common internal factors of the company are the level of corporate governance,transparency of information,the robustness of financial information,and the different characteristics of management.These factors will affect the company's stock market crash risk.From the perspective of the company's external influence,related factors such as interest rates on borrowings and trading markets will also have an impact on the risk of collapse.Before the promulgation of the "New Regulations on Reduction of Shares",stock pledge was used as a convenient and fast financing channel by a large number of listed companies.The shareholders of the listed company pledge the stock to the creditor to obtain financing,and the creditor holds the stock as collateral,and can perform the forced liquidation as the capital compensation under the necessary conditions.The willingness of creditors to participate in the governance of listed companies is not significant.After the promulgation of the new regulations on reduction of shares,the stocks that are pledges lose liquidity,and there is a stronger willingness to govern listed companies before the new rules of creditors are enacted to ensure that the debtor's stock pledge financing can be successfully repaid,while ensuring pledges.——The price of listed company stocks is stable.The promulgation of the "New Regulations on Reduction of Shares" has led to a certain degree of change in the governance of creditors.Therefore,this paper takes the release of the New Regulations as an external natural shock,and studies the relationship between the creditor governance of listed companies and the risk of stock collapse in the state of stock pledge.Carry out research in accordance with the following sections:The first part is the introduction,introducing the background of the research topic,and the stock crash risk continues to receive attention.Especially since 2018,listed companies have a significant risk of stock market crash.The specific performance is based on stock pledge as a transmission path.The controlling shareholder of a listed company with high stock pledge rate transmits a series of credit risks and crash risks caused by its own financial risks to listed subsidiaries.leading to the risk of stock collapse in listed companies.The second part is the literature review.This paper reviews the researches of past scholars on the mechanism of stock price collapse risk,the research on the impact of stock pledge on corporate governance and the theory of creditor governance,and introduces the content of the new regulations on reduction and its The impact of creditor governance.With regard to the analysis of the reasons for the stock price crash,scholars' theories can be summarized from the influence of internal and external factors of the company.The third part is the core research objectives and hypotheses of this paper.The core theoretical assumptions of this paper are as follows:(1)After the promulgation of the “New Regulations for Reduction of Shares”,the creditors of companies subject to policy intervention will have a reduced impact on the company's collapse risk;(2)After the promulgation of the “New Regulations for Reduction of Shares”,companies subject to policy intervention will pledge The higher the ratio,the higher the impact on the stock price crash risk.The fourth part introduces the sample selection,variable design and model construction of this paper.In order to study the policy effect of "Reduce the New Regulations",this paper constructs a dual difference model for quantitative research on policy effects.The fifth part is the analysis of the results of empirical research and the test of the robustness of the research conclusions.The sixth part is the further study of this paper.On the basis of studying the relationship between creditor governance and stock collapse risk,this paper puts forward three mechanisms for creditor governance to affect the risk of stock collapse,which are respectively financing constraints.R&D expenditures,agent costs,and further research on the impact of these three mechanisms on the new regulations.The seventh part is the research conclusion and prospect part of this paper.This paper studies the collapse risk from the perspective of the external shocks issued by the New Regulations.It not only verifies the relevant assumptions and conclusions of the original scholars,but also enriches the research scope of creditor governance and stock collapse.It has certain theoretical reference significance..The conclusions of this study are reflected in the reference role of regulatory policy makers on the one hand,and help creditors to better participate in corporate governance on the other hand.At the same time,this paper also has certain limitations,mainly reflected in the short observation window,the creditor governance effect and the impact path may be established only in a short period of time;the creditor's governance is still caused by the passive change of external shocks,and the future creditors change the pledge ratio,Risk management such as financing costs may make the research conclusions of this study not significant.