Research On The Influence Of Over-control Of Family Enterprises On Earnings Management

Accounting surplus is a reflection of the company's operating results,and is the focus of investors and enterprises.Its quality is not only related to the vital interests of investors but also affects the development of capital markets.However,the manipulation of accounting earnings for the purpose of encroachin g on the interests of small and medium-sized investors not only undermines the interests of investors and the development of enterprises,but also affects the order of capital markets.Managers implementing earnings management may be in multiple motives,but their implementation requires certain capabilities,which is closely related to th e company's control structure.On one hand,The control of the family business is mainly in the hands of the actual controller.The governance structure is mostly pyramid structure or cross-shareholding,which will enhance the control of the actual controller and form excess control,wh ich may generate additional income.The controller may have the incentive to seek private gains and use the earnings management to cover up the encroachment behavior.Absolute control gives it the ability to manage earnings.On the other hand,there are different levels of family members involved in the family bu siness governance structure,especially the general manager plays a key role in the formation of accounting earnings,and its holdings have a certain impact on the actual controller's earnings management behavior.And the professional general manager and the family general manager play different roles,and their interests and behaviors may also differ.Based on this,the actual controllers in th e family business to obtain private profi'ts and cover up the encroachment behavior is the source of earnings management.How does it affect the degree and mode of earnings management?As the main person in charge of accounting information,the general manager and his holdings will adjust the extent an d manner of the actual controller's earnings management behavior.Family business is a relatively common organizational form in China's social economy,and it is a major component of private enterprises.Its sustainable development is not satisfactory,and it does not fully exert its role in China's economy.Among them,the manager's earnings management behavior is One of the important influencing factors,in order to reflect the real surplus of enterprises,improve the quality of earnings,protect the interests of investors,promote the sustainable and healthy development of family businesses,and play the role of private enterprises in China's economy,it is necessary to go deep into the study of its governance structure to influence its factors.Therefore,in order to deeply study the influence of the excess control of the actual controller of the family business on the level and mode of earnings management,and the adjustment effect of the shareholding ratio of the general manager on the relationship between the two.This paper takes the 2010-2017 A-share family listed company as the research obj ect,and uses the stata analysis software to empirically test the relationship between the excess control rights and earnings management and the adjustment of the general manager's shareholding ratio.The research finds that:(1)the actual control person's excess control right and the accrued earnings management level show a significant positive correlation,and there is a weak positive relationship with the real earnings management level;(2)the general manager's shareholding ratio exceeds the excess control right and two Different types of earnings management methods have different adjustment effects,that is,they will negatively adjust the relationship between excess control rights and accrued earnings management levels,and positively adjust the relationship between excess control rights and real earnings management levels;(3)further divide the general manager according to source attributes.Later,it was found that the adjustment effect of the shareholding ratio of different types of general managers is different.The shareholding ratio of the general manager of the family will negatively adjust the excess control and accrued earnings management,especially the negative accrued earnings management relationship.The ratio will positively adjust the relationship between excess control rights and real earnings management,and negatively adjust the relationship between excess control rights and accrued earnings management.According to the results of empirical tests,it proposes targeted recommendations from the aspects of optimizing corporate governance structure,improving accounting standards,and strengthening family business supervision,which provides reference for the development of family businesses and the vitality of China's market economy.