Research On Behavior Of Shareholders And Corporate Decisions Based On Control Rights

With the development of corporate governance theory, many scholars find that there is a close relationship between control rights and power, ownership and control rights have great differences although they are closely related. However, theory of modern corporate control rights is imperfect, and content of theory of corporate control rights does not come to an agreement. Due to diverse forms and rich content of control rights, how to design a reasonable model to measure shareholders’control rights accurately, and promote theoretical study of control rights to empirical study become one of the hot and difficult issue in current research on theory of corporate control rights.From the perspective of voting mechanism of shareholders’ meeting, this paper measures control rights based on shareholders’relation and voting mechanism, and analyzes the impact of distribution features of control rights on corporate decisions and shareholders’behavior. Specific research revolves around the following four basic questions:The first question is how to measure shareholders’control rights accurately based on the voting rights, and how shareholders’relations affect shareholders’ control rights. The second question is why minority shareholders participate in the voting of shareholders’meeting, and can corporate governance be changed by the voting. The third question is how to allocate control rights of large shareholders in Chinese listing companies, and what degree of risk of control transfer faced by large shareholders. The fourth question is whether differences in companies with divergent allocation of control rights exist in shareholders’behavior and decision making,In order to find answers of these questions, this paper is divided into seven chapters and gets following conclusion:First, voting participation model of large and minority shareholders is established based on costs and benefits of voting. According to voting mechanism of shareholders’ meeting, shareholders’relations and willingness are included in the measure model of control rights, and the existing measurable model of shareholders’control rights has been optimized. Second, this paper analyses two major factors influence on abstain rates of minority shareholders, from the perspective of information asymmetry and benefit independency. Resolutions information of shareholders’ meeting is known by the public can help reduce abstention rates, and investors can be driven by their benefit to participate in the vote. Investors often choose to "vote with their feet" and sell then-shares faced with a "bad resolution" to reduce expected loss, and actively participate in the voting "good resolution". On the other hand, the participation of minority shareholders in the voting of shareholders’meeting has "cater effects", but doesnot have "supervision effects". Large shareholders issue more stock dividends to cater for minority shareholders, but they don’t reduce the scale of connected transaction even if participation rates of minority shareholders are high.Third, this paper analyses of the allocation of control rights in Chinese listed companies, from the perspective of investor protection, political connection, industry competition. Results show that regional investor protection has direct and positive impact on control rights of shareholders in state-owned companies, while regional investor protection influence shareholders’ control rights by corporate political connections in non-state-owned companies. Investor protection has significantly positive effect on control rights of large shareholders in lowly competitive industry companies, but the effect is not obvious in highly competitive industry companies. On the other hand, in order to reflect the market competition of control rights which large shareholders face, panel threshold model is used to calculate threshold values of control rights in ordinary resolutions and special resolutions. There are still a large number of large shareholders in Chinese listing companies face the risk of control transfer, under highly concentrated ownerships background.Fourth, control rights of large shareholders have significant impacts on adjustment speed of cash holdings, large shareholders with high control rights can increase adjustment speed of cash holdings, and listed companies can make a more rapid response to the change of internal and external environment. We find a significant nonlinear relationship between the impacts of the monetary policy on corporate cash holdings and control rights of shareholders, money policy shocks decreased with the increase of control rights in genera. Research on issue of excess compensation of executives in state-owned listed companies, we use control rights of large shareholders to reflect the supervision of large shareholders, and find that independence of the compensation committee cannot inhibit the CEO excess compensation, policy burden strength can significantly strengthen the supervision of large shareholders and reduce CEO excess compensation.Based on the cost-benefit analysis of voting, this paper focuses on cost difference between large shareholders and minority shareholders, and establishes the theoretical model of shareholder voting behavior. Then combined with voting rate and relations of two types of shareholders, new methods are designed to measure the control rights of listed companies and datum of control rights are used to resolve issues such as allocation of control rights, risk of control transfer, managerial decisions. This paper deepens the theoretical research on market of control rights and managerial decisions in Chinese listed companies, and gives some suggestions for investor protection and corporation governance.