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Is State-controlled Capital Inefficiently Allocated?

Posted on:2020-07-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R J ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330596481389Subject:Investment science
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
If capital is the essential fuel for the normal operation of the modern economic system,capital allocation should be the core driving force that determines the direction of economic system development.Capital allocation has different mechanisms of action in different economic systems.In the capitalist economic system,capital allocation follows the principle of maximizing profit.In the socialist planned economy system,capital allocation follows the principle of government distribution.While in China's current socialist market economy system,capital allocation must not only consider the market economy.The mode of operation cannot ignore the key role of the government in it,which forms a relatively complex economic decision-making system.Can this complex economic system also effectively allocate capital? In this system,capital allocation needs to weigh the choices.Under what circumstances and based on which principle should we allocate capital to achieve the goal of sustainable economic development? And why should we pursue economic growth and development,and what is the ultimate problem of sustained economic development?Based on the above considerations and questions,first of all,this paper chooses the allocation of state-owned capital as the research object,because the state-owned capital allocation is more complicated than the private capital allocation in decision-making mechanism,and it is necessary to seek a balance or the way of making choices between the government and the market.Secondly,this thesis attempts to analyze and explain the basic contradictions behind this socio-economic phenomenon of state-owned capital allocation through the basic theory of socialist political economy and the dialectical materialism and historical materialism methodology.Thirdly,state-owned and state-controlled industrial enterprises and local government investment and financing platforms serve as carriers of two different types of state-owned capital.This paper examines the effectiveness of state-owned capital allocation in these two economic systems through empirical research methods and case analysis methods.Tracing the source of problem and searching for a realistic breakthrough under the premise of basic contradictory analysis can provide a feasible path for the improvement of the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and the rectification of local government investment and financing platforms.The research results of this paper: First,through the interpretation of state-owned capital allocation based on the theory of socialist political economy,the basic contradiction of state-owned capital allocation is the incompatibility between economic efficiency goal and social benefit goal.Furthermore,the inherent contradiction between profit-seeking and public welfare is caused by economic power under the whole social category formed by capital,which is rooted in the duality of human beings.Second,through the dialectical materialism approach,this paper puts forward the positive value of realizing the comprehensive development of people for the allocation of state-owned capital.Third,on the basis of empirically testing the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,a theoretical model,for the evolution of the industrial structure of state-owned capital allocation,is constructed based on the theory of humanism and Maslow's hierarchy of needs.Fourth,this paper analyses the debt crisis of the local government investment and financing platform through the historical materialism method,and on the basis of theoretical guidance and practice,seeks out a feasible rectification plan for the local government investment and financing platform.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-owned Capital, Capital Allocation Efficiency, State-owned Enterprises, Local Government Investment and Financing Platform
PDF Full Text Request
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