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Protection Of Interests Of Small And Medium Investors Under The Dual Ownership Structure

Posted on:2020-08-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B Q XiongFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330596481469Subject:Financial
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,many high-quality high-tech enterprises in China have gone public in the United States,mainly because that they have adopted a special equity structure.It is a problem how to make the operating results of high-quality enterprises share with domestic investors and the domestic securities market has been considering.At present,China's securities market has begun to liberalize the regulations on the listing of companies with dual shareholding structure to a certain extent.The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has been allowing companies with different rights in the same period to list since the end of April 2018.The China Securities Regulatory Commission also announced the implementation rules for science and technology innovation board pilot on January 30,2019,allowing companies in specific industries to adopt a special shareholding structure.However,some scholars believe that the dual ownership structure allows the founder to control the company and increase the agency cost.Once listed,it may damage the interests of small and medium investors.However,some scholars believe that the dual ownership structure can protect the interests of small and medium investors if they can match the corresponding system.The United States is the country with the most mature dual ownership structure development.There are also many enterprises adopting this shareholding structure,and the corresponding supporting systems are also relatively perfect.Facebook is the top ten listed company with a dual ownership structure in the US high-tech enterprises.In order to guarantee the founder's control,Facebook has added an irrevocable proxy voting agreement in addition to the dual shareholding structure,further increasing the founder.The voting rights enable the founder to achieve absolute control over the enterprise,but also magnify the contradiction between the dual equity structure to enhance corporate efficiency and protect the interests of small and medium investors.This paper mainly introduces the development history of Facebook,analyzes its shareholding structure,analyzes the operation status after listing,and then analyzes the investment starting point and interest of small and medium investors to explain the dual equity structure.The protection mechanism of small and medium-sized investors' interests,and using the conclusions of the previously analyzed business results to assist in analyzing the realization path of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors.This paper finally came to the following conclusion,the dual shareholding structure gives the founding shareholders control over the company.Because the founder shareholders and ordinary shareholders differ in investment objectives,resource investment and risk-taking,the founder's control can maintain the corporate culture of individuality,improve the resilience of management,implement long-term development strategies and improve decision-making efficiency.In turn,the value of the enterprise is enhanced,and ultimately the interests of small and medium investors are indirectly protected.Finally,China compares the shareholding structure of Alibaba and JD.com,which is a typical special equity structure company,with Facebook,and proposes the policy recommendations for implementing the dual shareholding structure in China based on the corresponding institutional measures in the United States.This paper specifically adopted case analysis method,event research method,etc.to conduct research and analysis.Through the analysis of Facebook,companies with dual ownership structure can protect the interests of small and medium investors by promoting the value of the company because of certain mechanisms of its existence,rather than some scholars believe that it is not good for small and medium investors.However,the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors requires not only the development of the company's own mechanisms,but also the corresponding external supervision,including the supervision of enterprises,as well as strengthening the education of small and medium-sized investors and improving the post-reliance mechanism.To reduce the possibility of harming the interests of small and medium investors from the system.
Keywords/Search Tags:Dual ownership structure, Psychological ownership, Control power, Corporate Governance
PDF Full Text Request
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