On Causes And Econimic Conquences Of Frequent Transfers Of Control Rights

In October 1993,shenbao 'an's acquisition of yanzhong industrial co.In April 1994,zhuhai hengtong company was transferred the shares of Shanghai lingguang held by Shanghai building materials company,obtained the 35.5% state-owned shares of listed lingguang industry,and became the largest shareholder.This was the first case in China that the control right of a state-owned holding company was transferred by agreement.Since the 1990 s,the transfer of control rights of listed companies in China has become increasingly common.With the continuous expansion of the scale of corporate control transfer,more and more transactions are involved,and the impact on economic development is increasingly significant.But whether the transfer of control plays a positive role is still a question to be proved.In addition,in many cases of the transfer of corporate control,what usually happens is a transfer of control,that is,after the transfer of control of the listed company in a short period of time,there will not be a second transfer of control.However,as a result of the restructuring of state-owned enterprises,the transfer of control over resources of zhongrun is too bumpy,with a total of 10 controlling shareholders.The controlling shareholders of zhongrun resources have experienced the replacement of municipal government,stateowned enterprises and private enterprises,which not only represents the implementation process of property right reform,but also includes almost all the ways of controlling shareholders to change.Taking case analysis as the research method,this paper selects zhongrun resources as the case company to study the deep reasons and economic consequences of the frequent transfer of control rights within 25 years since its listing by analyzing and studying the way of transfer of control rights of each controlling shareholder,the consideration paid and the benefits obtained.Firstly,the paper introduces the general situation of zhongrun resources and the process of control transfer.Secondly,the paper analyzes the reasons for the frequent transfer of control rights of resources of zhongrun,explores the deep reasons for the frequent change of major shareholders from the perspective of theoretical basis and case practice,and analyzes the different reasons,so as to guide the subsequent research on the economic consequences of the transfer of control rights of resources of zhongrun.Specifically,this paper explores the influence of frequent changes of major shareholders on corporate performance,and discusses the influence approaches and private benefits obtained by major shareholders during the transfer of control rights.Finally,the conclusion of this case study is drawn and relevant policy Suggestions are provided for the regulatory authorities.Main innovation point of this article has the following two aspects,one is may control frequent transformation is one of the controlling shareholder's private benefits on the path,because of the existing literature about the transfer of control research has focused on corporate control transfer effects on its performance,less focus on control transfer agent,discuss the controlling shareholders use few enterprises frequently grab a the possibility of private benefits of control transfer.Second,existing literatures mostly take the listed companies that have transferred control rights as samples to conduct empirical research on their performance,and no unified conclusion has been reached.In this paper,the research on the transfer of control rights of zhongrun resources is carried out in the form of case study.In addition,most of the existing literatures discussed the enterprise performance of the onetime transfer of control rights,while the case company zhongrun resources frequently experienced the transfer of control rights.Through the study of the case company zhongrun resources,this paper concludes the reasons for the frequent transfer of control rights of listed companies and the resulting economic consequences.On this basis,some Suggestions are put forward.This paper finds that there are four reasons for frequent transfer of control rights: first,blind investment by controlling shareholders;second,controlling shareholders grab private income;third,the supervisory board fails to give full play to its supervisory function;fourth,information asymmetry among small and medium-sized shareholders.The economic consequences are mainly reflected in that the relevant financial indicators of zhongrun resources are much lower than the industry average.In this regard,we put forward three Suggestions: first,to improve information transparency and ensure the interests of minority shareholders;The second is to promote the board of supervisors to play its role,which can be guaranteed by maintaining the independence of the board of supervisors and improving the professional level of its members.Third,it is necessary to strengthen the external regulatory environment and formulate relevant policies to constrain the transfer of control rights.Through the research on the case of Zhongrun Resources,this paper draws out the reasons for the frequent transfer of control rights of listed companies and the economic consequences.On this basis,it puts forward some suggestions that can be considered in the governance supervision mechanism: First,improve transparency of information to protect the interest of investors.The selection and evaluation of independent directors should be more rigorous and work achievements.Second,it is necessary to promote the role of the board of supervisors.The inependence of the Board of Supervisors and the improvement of the level of the members of the Board of Supervisors to ensure the supervision and promotion of the functions of the Board of Supervisors;Third,the need to strengthen the external regulatory environment,the state has formulated more relevant policies to restrict the transfer of control rights.