Research On The Controlling Rights Allocation And Corporate Performance Of China’s Private Listed Companies

Accompanied by reform of China’s socialist market economy and capitalmarkets constantly improve, private enterprises have become a vital force in China’seconomic development. It plays a positive role in the perfection of the modernenterprise system in China, the optimal allocation of resources deepen the reform ofeconomic system. Private enterprise has inherent advantages, Clear property rightsand independent management, mechanisms to simplify and flexible operation and soon. Simplified the structure to make the procedures easier and highly centralizeddecision-making mechanism can respond quickly to market. Meanwhile, the internalstructure of private enterprise determines the characteristics of corporate governance.Thus the private listed company’s internal governance mechanisms become the focusof extensive research of the theoretical circle.Effective allocation of control right is the premise of the company’s efficientgovernance and is also the key factor to improve company performance. Theallocation of control rights is coordinated by the internal control mechanisms andexternal control mechanism. Internal control mechanisms is clearly defined throughthe company’s rules and regulations for internal stakeholders, board of directors,managers enjoy the right to have a positive effect on the company’s operations.External control mechanisms, means from outside the subject and marketsupervision and restraint mechanisms. Corporate control whether effectiveconfiguration depends on the right configuration within the company shareholders,board of directors. This paper by summarizing the existing research, defined the definition of control and private listed companies, According to the development andfeatures of China’s private listed companies, combination of theory and practice,further investigate the control of China’s private listed companies in differentconfigurations between the three stakeholder influences on corporate performance.This article selected871sample data of the341private companies in Shanghaiand Shenzhen listed, adopt a number of companies financial indicators come to thecorporate performance indicators by principal component analysis, Based on thecorrelation analysis, regression analysis of sample data can draw the followingconclusions: In the share holder, There is a significant positive correlation betweenownership concentration, degree of ownership balance and corporate performance.Board of directors, the total number of directors, and the proportion of independentdirectors can improve company performance. There is a significant negativecorrelation between the number of meetings of the Board and CorporatePerformance. In management, layer manager shareholding ratio is positivelycorrelated with company performance, chairman and general manager of the rightone is negatively correlate with corporate performance. Finally, makerecommendations to solve China’s private listed companies effective control over theconfiguration and a valid solution to the enterprise exists generally in theprincipal-agent problem.