Research On Managerial Excess Compensation,Corporate Tax Avoidance And Corporate Investment Efficiency

As an important core of financial decision-making,investment decision-making is directly related to the efficiency of enterprise resources use and even the success or failure of operation,and affects the future development of enterprises.A large number of studies have shown that information asymmetry and agency problems are the main factors that affect the investment efficiency of enterprises.This leads to the exploration of enterprise investment efficiency in the framework of principal-agent.The important achievement is to form the concept of tax avoidance agent,and it is thought that the tax avoidance will aggravate the agency problem and the degree of information asymmetry,and then increase the self-interest motivation and behavior of the executive,and make it more inclined to engage in business decision-making with its own utility and lower the enterprise efficiency investment.As the decision-makers of corporate tax and investment activities,executives consider the emergence of executive self-interest motivation from the perspective of influencing their business decision-making behavior.The research on the incentive mechanism of managers is paid more attention to,which can stimulate the enthusiasm of senior executives to work hard,and realize the maximum unity with the interests of shareholders and the value of enterprises.As a new exploration of executive incentive mechanism in the research of agency problem,excess executive compensation has formed twomainstream views: effective contract theory and manager power theory.The focus of the debate is which theory is more suitable to explain the phenomenon of executive excess pay.Based on the principal-agent theory,the information asymmetry theory,the optimal contract theory,the management power theory and the salary championship theory,this paper selects the sample data of China's A-share listed enterprises from 2012 to 2016,and probes into the following questions.(1)Whether the excess compensation can effectively restrain the self-interest motivation of the executive,reduce the tax-seeking behavior of the executive,and reduce the enterprise's tax radical degree;(2)the effect of tax-avoidance behavior on the investment efficiency of the enterprise;(3)whether the excess compensation can reduce the tax radical degree of the enterprise by inhibiting the tax-avoidance behavior of the executive,In turn,it can help to mitigate that effect of agent problem and information asymmetry in turn on the investment efficiency of the enterprise because of the tax avoidance activities.The following conclusions are drawn:First,on the whole,the executive compensation contract of listed companies in China still has a strong incentive effect.The excess compensation is mainly the compensation for the ability of senior executives and the compensation for dealing with the complex business environment,which is the embodiment of the premium of human capital.The performance is to restrain the self-interest motivation of executives and reduce the degree of radicalizationof tax avoidance by tax avoidance and rent-seeking.Secondly,tax evasion aggravates the degree of information asymmetry and aggravates the agency problem.Increase the self-interest behavior of the senior executives in the investment activities,reduce the investment efficiency of the enterprise.Third,excess compensation effectively stimulates the enthusiasm and initiative of senior executives.Effective mitigation of agency conflicts and suppression of self-interest The behavior of interest hiding and manipulation weakens the positive correlation between the degree of tax avoidance and inefficient investment,and improves the investment efficiency of enterprises.Fourth,distinguish ownership types,excess executive compensation incentive effect is more significant in private holding listed companies,more in line with the concept of competence and effective contract theory.This study contributes solid empirical evidence to the applicability of the effective contract theory of excess executive compensation in China's listed companies,indicating that the "one size fits all" salary restriction is not necessarily reasonable.The absolute uniform salary standard is not conducive to reflect the management ability and the risk-taking spirit of the executive value.The conclusion of this paper is to enrich the research content of tax avoidance agency,which has important enlightenment to the business decision-making of enterprises,and provides a new thinking and empirical reference for the study of improving the investment efficiency of enterprises.