| In recent years,e-commerce technology and network applications are growing rapidly and continuously in China,More and more traditional retail enterprises have begun to establish online channel for product sales,and in order to expand market share,many retailers who only have online channels have added new offline channels,forming a dual channel structure.However,the dual-channel model brings some new problems.The online channel has lower prices due to the lack of service,and the offline channel has a higher cost because of the cost of providing in-store experience services.On one hand,this triggers the conflict between channels,and on the other hand,that leads to the free-riding behavior of consumers,which has a certain influence on the decisionmaking of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain in terms of price and service.In addition,due to the fierce competition in the market,the status of retailers in the supply chain has also changed,leading to the situation that retailers dominate the supply chain,and the representative companies are Wal-Mart and Carrefour.The change of dominance also affects the pricing of supply chain members to some extent.Therefore,it is of great significance to take consumers' free-riding behavior into account and discuss it from different power structures when studying the pricing and coordination issues in retailers dual-channel supply chain.Firstly,this paper analyzes the equilibrium of the members of the dual-channel supply chain under the centralized decision-making,manufacturer-led and retailer-led decentralized decision-making,and coordinates the retailer dual-channel supply with different contracts under different power structures.The influence of free riding on supply chain decision making is analyzed,the validity of contract model is verified,and the optimal decision of supply chain under two dominant rights is compared and analyzed with examples.The results show that free-riding behavior of consumers leads to a reduction in service levels and a reduction in the profitability of supply chain members,whether under manufacturer-led or retail-led decentralized decisions.But the decisions made by the dominant members are more beneficial to themself,and the profits they earn are relatively more.With the increase of free-rider coefficient,the service level in the centralized decision-making decreases first and then increases,while the total profit of supply chain continues to decrease,but both are higher than that in the decentralized decision-making situation.For the manufacturer-led supply chain and the retailer-led supply chain,we can use the revenue sharing contract and the two-part tariff contracts to achieve supply chain coordination respectively,and it can achieve pareto improvement of both parties' benefits under certain conditions.Secondly,it explores the impact of free-riding coefficient on retailer channel selection in the supply chain under different power structures.The pricing models of single traditional channel supply chain and single network channel supply chain under the leadership of manufacturer and retailer are respectively established,the optimal solution is obtained by stackelberg game,and comparing with the equilibrium results of dual channels from Chapter 3.The results show that in the supply chain under different dominances,a single traditional channel is always better than a single network channel for retailers,so the retailers' optimal channel exists in the dual channel and a single traditional channel,and it ultimately depends on the range of the cross-price elasticity coefficient and the consumer free rider coefficient,only when the two are within a certain range,retailers will choose dual channels.However,this range is not the same in the supply chain under different dominances.Finally,we summarize the full text,draw the research conclusions and management inspiration,and on this basis,we put forward some suggestions for the future research direction of free-riding behavior in the dual channel. |
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