Research On The Strategy And Coordination Mechanism Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Members Considering Free-riding Behavior Of Consumers

With the continuous growth of Internet users and the government's strong support for the enterprise's "Internet +" industry,e-commerce is becoming more and more mature with the trend of the times.In order to increase their sales and profits,many companies have opened online direct sales channels based on the original single retail channel.This dual-channel sales model gives consumers multiple choices.On the one hand,consumers may go to offline retail stores to learn about product information and experience the product,and then choose to buy at a more direct online sales channel with a better price;on the other hand,they may also see advertising information released by the manufacturer through various media Later,he chose to buy at a nearby retail store.This free-riding behavior of consumers makes the cost-paying channels fail to obtain due benefits,while the cost-free channels take advantage of fishermen.Based on the theory of dual-channel supply chain and consumer free-riding research,this paper uses differential game theory to study the impact of unidirectional free-riding behavior and two-way free-riding behavior on supply chain member strategies and goodwill over time.The dynamic impact of changes on the profitability of supply chain systems.It mainly includes the following two aspects:(1)Using differential game theory,we studied the optimal strategies and product goodwill changes of supply chain members under different decision-making situations under the unidirectional free ride behavior of consumers experiencing online purchases,and designed a cost sharing contract Model to coordinate the supply chain system in the case of decentralized decision to achieve Pareto improvement.The research results show that,compared with the centralized decision-making situation,the retailer's service efforts will decrease as the consumer's free-riding coefficient increases in the decentralized decision-making situation,and the product goodwill will also decrease,which will not be conducive to the increase in the profit of the entire supply chain.By establishing a costsharing contract model,manufacturers share part of the retailer 's service costs will improve the adverse impact of free-riding on the retailer,thus increasing the enthusiasm of the retailer 's service,and at the same time improving the goodwill of the product,increasing the manufacturer and retail The profits of the businessmen,in turn,achieved Pareto improvements.(2)Following the above research method,the dynamic impact of consumers 'two-way free-riding behavior on supply chain members' optimal strategies,goodwill changes,and system profits is considered.The dynamic programming theory is used to construct the HJB equation of member profit under different decision-making situations in the supply chain,to obtain the optimal strategy of the manufacturer and retailer and the brand goodwill.Through comparison,find the causes of channel conflicts caused by consumer free-riding,and use cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the supply chain.Finally,through analysis of examples,the impact and coordination of consumer's two-way free-riding behavior on member strategies,goodwill and profits are obtained.After the Pareto improvement effect.The research in this paper theoretically enriches the research on various equilibrium strategies and coordination mechanisms of dual-channel supply chain members under consumer free-riding behavior,and how to formulate optimal advertising strategies and services for manufacturers and retailers under consumer free-riding behavior Strategies provide constructive theoretical guidance.It also provides a reference for real-life companies to consider the impact of changes in goodwill on profits when setting profit targets for a period of time.