Directional Private Placement And Interest Transfer Of Listed Companies

At present,Directional Directional private placement has gradually become the most mainstream refinancing method in China's capital market.As of 2018,about 30% of listed companies have implemented or have issued directional private placement plans.The directional directional private placement can be a key link in restoring the company's “three-step” refinancing,and is widely praised by the market because it has unique advantages that cannot be replaced compared to other financing methods.In order to regulate the frequent occurrence of directional issuance in the capital market,the China Securities Regulatory Commission has successively introduced a number of management systems to regulate the rational formulation of prices in the directional private placement and the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors,so as to prevent the dark passage of interest transmission.However,due to the lack of domestic theoretical research on private placement,especially the lack of empirical quantitative support and effective market feedback,some of the details of the implementation of the regulatory policies and practice are still in urgent need of improvement.Based on this background,how to better standardize the practice of directional private placement and enable it to take advantage of market refinancing in a reasonable and fair manner has become a difficult problem for the regulatory layer in the future.This also makes it possible to study the directional increase of Chinese listed companies under the leadership of major shareholders,especially through the existing directional private placement theory,information asymmetry theory,agency theory,etc.to explore the conflict of interest between major shareholders and small and medium shareholders in private placement.It is particularly urgent to analyze the behavior of major shareholders in detail to show the transfer of benefits or the synergy of interests.The analysis of typical cases can provide us with more detailed and in-depth empirical evidence,and can also provide some direction and basis for the optimization and regulation of relevant policies.Based on the existing directional private placement theory,information asymmetry framework,agency cost perspective,and the unique institutional background of China's capital market,we are targeting the Shengtun Mining Group Co.,Ltd.(stock code: 600711;hereinafter referred to as Shengtun Mining)The typical case of additional issuance carried out systematic theoretical research,and deeply analyzed the opportunistic behavior and economic consequences of the major shareholder in the process of additional issuance.The research results show that although the large shareholders advertised that the directional directional private placement is a synergy with the interests of small and medium shareholders,due to the lack of corresponding institutional guarantees,the majority shareholder of Shengtun Mining manipulated the stock price before the issuance,and injected assets that were not conducive to small and medium shareholders during the issuance process.And after the issuance of high dividends,high transfer,reduction of cash,and shareholder collective pledge of equity lending arbitrage and other means to achieve the purpose of the transfer of benefits from the listed company.This paper has certain enlightenment significance for the formulation of policies and regulations related to directional private placement in the process of gradual improvement.