Research On The Tunneling And Propping Behavior Of The Private Affiliated Group Controller From The Perspective Of Equity Pledge

Since 2018,the downward pressure of China's economy has gradually increased,and the development of enterprises is facing severe challenges.Problems such as lack of liquidity,narrow financing channels and high financing costs are all hindering the development of enterprises.In this context,more and more major shareholders of listed companies are financing through equity pledge.However,with the increasing volatility of the capital market and the disclosure of 140 million shares pledge default information of the actual controller of laxabel,the risk of equity pledge is once again valued by all parties.Since the opening of China's capital market,the development of many years makes the ownership of listed companies appear more centralized,which leads to more and more obvious conflicts between large and small shareholders.Although the centralized equity can standardize the management of the company to a certain extent and make the operation of the company more efficient,the major shareholders will also use their higher control rights to affect the company's decision-making and planning and deployment,so as to obtain the excess income beyond their own equity.At the same time,the capital power of our country has given birth to numerous huge "clan" enterprises,which control many listed companies,and arbitrarily hollows out the listed companies with the help of their complex equity structure to damage the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,while the seemingly common financing means such as equity pledge,to a certain extent,promotes the interest transmission behavior of the controlling shareholders,and the controllers often communicate with each other The funds raised by the pledge of stock rights infringe the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders in various ways.In view of the equity pledge behavior of the clan controller,this paper expounds the advantages,causes,risks and economic consequences of the clan controller's equity pledge in a theoretical way,and selects three listed companies of the private clan "Great Wall family" and the related parties disclosed in their annual reports based on the above content.From the perspective of equity pledge,this paper studies the fact in detail Zhao ruiyong,the international controller,has the motivation,process and economic consequences of interest transmission in the process of building the "Great Wall territory".Finally,in order to protect the rights and interests of the majority of small and medium-sized shareholders,some suggestions are put forward on how to prevent the major shareholders from using equity pledge to transfer the interests of listed companies.Through the case analysis of this paper,we can find that the equity pledge plays an important role in the process of interest transmission of the clan controller.The funds raised by the pledge not only help the actual controller to complete the performance commitment,but also provide fund support for the subsequent related M & A to avoid the examination of the M & A and reorganization committee of CSRC.However,the legal system of information disclosure is blank and flawed,which makes the small and medium-sized shareholders unable to detect their interest transmission behavior,resulting in the risk of equity pledge transferred to the small and medium-sized shareholders,and the listed company's performance thunderstorm,year after year loss,illegal punishment and so on make the small and medium-sized shareholders suffer huge losses.