A Study On Equity Incentive, Earnings Management And Inefficient Investment

Investment is the main driver of enterprise growth.It determines the business risk,profitability and capital market's evaluation of its business performance and development prospects.With the separation of modern enterprise ownership and management rights,the phenomenon of under-investment based on information asymmetry and excessive investment caused by agency conflicts have reduced the company's investment efficiency and become an important factor hindering the growth and development of the company.Therefore,how to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises and realize the value-added of corporate capital value has become the focus of scholars in the practical and theoretical circles.The equity incentive system originally originated in western countries.It is considered as a long-term incentive mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts and reduce agency costs.It is one of the effective means to realize the convergence of shareholders' interests and managers' interests.Whether its design and implementation are reasonable and directly affects Company management behavior.Managers' investment behavior directly affects the future development and growth of the company.Earnings management is the result of management's opportunistic behavior.Low-quality accounting information increases the uncertainty of information and ultimately affects the investment of internal investors and external investors.behavior.Therefore,whether the implementation of China's equity incentive system can effectively alleviate the management's non-efficiency investment behavior and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises by inhibiting the management of earnings management has important research value and practical value.At present,there are many studies on equity incentive and investment efficiency and equity incentives and earnings management.However,equity incentives,earnings management and non-efficiency investments have not been studied under a unified framework.It has not been analyzed whether equity incentives will pass.Affect the management's earnings management behavior,which in turn affects the investment efficiency of the company.Based on this,this paper studies equity incentives,earnings management and investment efficiency as a whole,and uses earnings management as a mediator variable to test whether equity incentives affect the investment efficiency of enterprises and whether the intermediary effect of earnings management is significant.This paper takes 2008-2017 China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research samples,and uses non-efficiency investment,over-investment and under-investment as the dependent variables to divide earnings management into accrued earnings management and As a mediator variable,real earnings management examines the impact of equity incentives on non-efficiency investment of enterprises,and on this basis,it tests whether the intermediary effect transmission mechanism of earnings management is significant.The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between equity incentives and inefficient investment and underinvestment of listed companies.That is,equity incentives generally inhibit the inefficient investment of listed companies and alleviate the phenomenon of insufficient investment,but the inhibition of excessive investment.It is not significant;there is a negative correlation between equity incentives and accrued earnings management,that is,equity incentives can inhibit management's accrued earnings management incentives,and there is a negative correlation between equity incentives and real earnings management,that is,equity incentives inhibit management's real earnings management motivation Whether accrued earnings management or real earnings management is significantly positively related to non-efficiency investment,over-investment and under-investment,that is,the higher the degree of earnings management of the company's management,the greater the possibility of non-efficiency investment.Accrued earnings management and real earnings management are some of the mediator variables that affect the inefficient investment and underinvestment of equity incentives.