Research On Incentive Model Of Logistics Park PPP Projects Based On Multi-task Principal- Agent And Reputation Effects

With the acceleration of China's urbanization process and the vigorous development of social capital,the government continuously promotes to use PPP mode to provide infrastructure and services,logistics park is a quasi-operational infrastructure,there are many problems when developing logistics park project with PPP mode,such as low service level and information construction level,lack of service characteristics,etc.Therefore,it is of great significance to set up the incentive mechanism to promote the rational allocation of resources by the private sector,and to improve the level of service and information input in the logistics park PPP project.Firstly,this thesis expounds the necessity of considering the multi-task,quasi-operational and long operation period of the logistics park PPP projects when incentive contract is designed,then,the research status of PPP incentive model,multi-task model,reputation model and logistics park PPP project are summarized.Secondly,considering the relative importance and interchangeable degree of different tasks,the static incentive model of PPP project is established.And then,on the basis of the above model,this thesis introduces quality-benefit conversion factor and establishes the static incentive model of logistics park PPP projects.Finally,the characteristics of long operation period of logistics park PPP projects has been considered and the internal reputation mechanism has been introduced into the dynamic incentive model,in which the operational period is divided into 2 phases;besides,the dynamic incentive model is based on the static incentive model of logistics park PPP projects,and the effects of service cost coefficient,economical task importance and perceived risk for social income on the optimal solution of the model are analyzed,then,the dynamic incentive model of logistics park PPP projects and the static incentive model of logistics park PPP projects are compared and analyzed,and the utility function and total project revenue of the above two models are compared with the example analysis.The following conclusions have been drawn.First,the static incentive model of PPP projects can be used by government to encourage the private sector to input rational resources between different tasks,in which case the government will alleviate the incentive distortion effectively and receive better incentive effects.Second,the static incentive model of logistics park PPP project realizes Pareto improvement and achieve a win-win effect between the government and the private sector,in which the market reputation effect is considered.Last,when the internal reputation mechanism is introduced,the dynamic incentive model of logistics park PPP project cannot only motivate the private sector to allocate resources reasonably from an overall perspective,but also improve the level of efforts of the private sector.In conclusion,this thesis studies the design of incentive contract in the logistics park PPP projects,which enriches the existing PPP incentive theory and provides the basis for the government's incentive decision in the logistics park PPP projects.