Equity Pledge, Analyst Tracking And Stock Price Collapse Risk

With the development of the capital market and the increase in capital requirements of listed companies,equity pledge is becoming more and more popular as a flexible and convenient way of financing.Existing research has found that equity pledges have a certain impact on the stock price fluctuations of listed companies.Equity pledge is often accompanied by the risk of transfer of control rights.Once the stock price falls to the liquidation line,the pledged shares may be forced to sell,causing the stock price to fall more sharply,threatening the interests of the majority of stock investors,making the stock price The risk of collapse has increased,which is not conducive to the stability of the capital market.So,relevant scholars and regulatory authorities need to analyze and answer the internal mechanism of the shareholder pledge behavior of the major shareholder and the stock price crash and how to reduce the stock price crash.Securities analysts have become an indispensable part of China's capital market.Whether securities analysts can play the role of their own information intermediary and whether they can reduce the asymmetry of information has always been a controversial topic.In theory,the existence of an analyst can provide more information to investors,thus reducing the degree of information asymmetry.However,an increasing number of empirical papers confirm that analysts tend to release good news to the market and reduce the release of bad news,which is mostly optimistic about market expectations,thus allowing securities analysts to obtain more commission income.This makes the degree of information asymmetry in the securities market stronger,which is not conducive to the stability of stock prices and even capital markets.Based on relevant theoretical analysis,this paper analyzes the A-share listed companies of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2013-2017,and examines the impact of large shareholder equity pledge and analyst following behavior on the stock price crash risk,and research analysts following this An external supervisory factor as a moderator affects the relationship between the shareholder pledge of the major shareholder and the stock price crash risk.The study found that large shareholder equity pledges and analyst following behavior have a significant positive impact on stock price crash risk.Since the seller analyst is the main part of the current analyst team in China,the analyst faces a large conflict of interest,and can not effectively play the role of information intermediary and even aggravate the degree of market information asymmetry,making the shareholder pledge and stock price of the major shareholder.The positive relationship between the risk of collapse is more pronounced.The research in this paper has enriched the research on the pledge of the shareholder's equity,and to some extent,the research on the factors affecting the stock price collapse has been more perfect,and the management of the external policing factors such as the regulation and improvement of the equity pledge system and the follow-up of the analyst has certain revelation.