Research On The Relationship Between Ownership Structure,executive Compensation Stickiness And Enterprise Performance

The separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers,thus resulting in the principal-agent problem.In order to alleviate the principal-agent problem,the performance-based pay contract emerges.It can effectively improve the management efficiency through a way which links the salary of enterprise managers to their performance.However,in recent years,high-level executive compensation has caused widespread concern in society,and scholars have also paid attention to this phenomenon.Specifically,when the performance of an enterprise increases,the executive compensation level will increase significantly,while it declines,the executive compensation will not decline or only a small margin.In the field of executive compensation stickiness research,most scholars conduct empirical studies on the existence,characteristics and influencing factors of stickiness of executive compensation,which to some extent ignore the influence of executive pay stickiness on the future performance of enterprises.Based on the above,this paper,discusses the influencing factors of stickiness of executive compensation and its influence on the future performance of enterprises.Firstly,this paper reviews relevant literature on ownership structure,stickiness of executive compensation,and enterprise performance.Then it is further deepened based on the principal-agent theory,optimal salary contract theory,managerial power theory and incentive theory,and put forward relevant assumptions.Finally,this article selects information technology industry listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as the research sample to measure the equity structure by equity concentration,management shareholding and equity balance,and uses main business profit to measure enterprise performance.Conducting descriptive statistics on the collected sample data of 397 listed companies,and establishing the multiple regression model by STATA12.0,analyzing the existence of executive compensation stickiness,its influencing factors and the influence of executive compensation stickiness on the future performance of enterprises.Therefore,the following conclusions are obtained:(1)the executive compensation of a-share information technology companies in China has obvious stickiness.Compared with the reduction range of executive compensation when the company's performance declines,the increase range of executive compensation when the company's performance rises is 1.77 times that of the company;(2)Excessive equity concentration will aggravate the stickiness of executive compensation.(3)The more management shareholding,the higher the sensitivity of executive pay performance,help to ease the stickiness of executive compensation.(4)The higher the degree of equity balance,the weaker the stickiness of executive compensation.(5)The existence of stickiness of executive compensation is negatively correlated with the future performance of the enterprise,and has no incentive effect on the executives.Based on the above research,this paper puts forward the following Suggestions: The enterprise should improve the incentive mechanism of executive compensation;continue to maintain the current high level of management shareholding and equity balance;proper decentralization of rights and interests enables shareholders to form a mechanism of checks and balances between each other,so as to curb the phenomenon of "one share being dominant" among major shareholders;increase the transparency of enterprise information,and improve enterprise performance appraisal system.In addition,attaching importance to the size of the independent directors and the board of supervisors,and put their supervisory responsibilities into practice.